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Article

Random Selection for Scaling Standards
Michael Abramowicz†
INTRODUCTION
Standards don’t scale. When adjudication costs are relatively
high, according to the canonical economic advice on rules versus
standards, rules are preferable.1 The virtue of standards is that they
allow the law to be tailored to individual circumstances,2 but applying
a standard to millions of citizens will be unworkable if many will invoke costly procedures to explain their unique situations. And so, to
achieve mass justice, regulators usually seek to create detailed rules3
despite the inevitability that they will be overinclusive and underinclusive.4 But could standards scale? If legislatures could reduce the
cost of adjudication but still ensure that like cases are treated reasonably alike,5 then massive spending programs could be administered
† Professor of Law, George Washington University. For helpful comments, I
thank Steve Charnovitz, Rob Glicksman, Renee Lerner, Chip Lupu, Joshua Mitts, Naomi
Schoenbaum, Steve Schooner, and Jonathan Siegel. All errors are my own. Copyright ©
2021 by Michael Abramowicz.
1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 572 (1992) (“The difference in promulgation costs favors standards, whereas
that in enforcement costs favors rules.”); Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Rules Versus Standards
in Rich and Poor Countries: Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in LowIncome Countries, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 113, 116 (2006) (“The cost effectiveness of
rules versus standards has to do with the relative size of various costs associated with
the specification, adjudication and enforcement of legal norms.”).
2. See, e.g., Ernst Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437,
438 (1921) (identifying “flexibility” as a benefit of indefinite standards).
3. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470 (1983) (allowing an agency to
create rules even where the statute requires consideration of individual circumstances).
4. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31–34 (1991) (explaining that
rules are overinclusive and underinclusive relative to their purposes).
5. One danger of a standard is that a decisionmaker may reach results for reasons that the creator of the standard and that most other decisionmakers applying the
same standard would have thought inappropriate. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
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through simple standards, with no need to approximate those standards with rules. This Article explores a novel technique for accomplishing this goal: allowing claimants to sell their claims to intermediaries and then distributing the government subsidy to the
intermediaries in proportion to valuation of a small number of randomly selected claims.
Consider a hypothetical program for which a broad standard
seems infeasible using conventional regulatory techniques: a legislature is considering a statute to mitigate climate change (perhaps
through a carbon tax6) but it wishes to provide transition relief for
those likely to be adversely affected.7 An administrative agency might
be created to administer a standard, such as a provision entitling any
citizen claimant to “compensation sufficient so that the statute will not
have a significantly disproportionate effect on the claimant.” But if
lower-level bureaucrats rendered awards directly under the standard,
intolerable inconsistency might result.8 The conventional legal response would be to approximate the standard with rules identifying
discrete classes of people entitled to benefits,9 such as coal miners
who will lose their jobs or drivers of Hummer automobiles who will
have to scrap their cars or pay more for gas. The regulations would
almost surely omit many affected individuals.10 Regulators will probably ignore the waitstaff at a diner frequented primarily by coal miners, for example. Any rules are likely to be so imperfect—overcompensating some and undercompensating others, sometimes for political
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 592 (5th ed. 1998) (noting “a broad standard . . . raises
agency costs,” which is contrary to the standard’s goal); SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 98
(noting that rules limit the power of judges); Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 352 (2011)
(“Many observers hypothesize that law predominates when rules are determinate and
ideology predominates when rules are indeterminate.” (citation omitted)).
6. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 499, 527 (2009) (considering a myriad of design issues with such a
tax); CONG. BUDGET OFF., EFFECTS OF A CARBON TAX ON THE ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2013) (assessing a carbon tax’s effects).
7. Cf. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENV’T L.
REV. 91, 101–03 (2011) (discussing past efforts to provide transitional financial relief
to those adversely affected by environmental legislation).
8. Administrative agencies often give discretion to officials, but they seek to constrain such discretion, for example with detailed substantive rules. See generally
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
469 (1986) (identifying various types of discretion and means by which they are controlled).
9. See, e.g., Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2012)
(discussing the basis on which classes are defined for class-action suits).
10. See SCHAUER, supra note 4.
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reasons and sometimes as a result of sheer administrative necessity—
that the legislature might well decide to give up on compensation, or
even on the climate change legislation altogether.
Enter random selection markets. The government would create a
fund—say, $1 trillion, though the same principles would apply to an
experimental program many orders of magnitude smaller—that it
would distribute in proportion to valuations of randomly selected
claims held by intermediaries who have purchased them from the
original claimants. That is, instead of allowing every citizen to make a
direct claim to an administrative agency, claimants would sell their
rights in the fund to the intermediaries. Only a very small number of
rights, maybe 1,000, would be selected at random for the agency to
adjudicate. Each of these cases would involve a careful adjudication
before a multi-member tribunal. Continuing the example above, the
tribunal’s task would be to estimate the claimant’s disproportionate
loss from the legislation, if any. Adjudicating 1,000 cases is a far more
manageable task for an administrative agency than adjudicating millions of separate claims. Lawyers would have ample incentive to develop factual and legal arguments in these cases, because much more
would be at stake: the entire fund would be distributed to the intermediaries holding these rights, with the amount each intermediary receives proportional to the judicial valuation of the corresponding
claim.
Superficially, this might appear to be a lottery, rewarding the intermediaries purchasing claims at random. But the prospect of this ultimate payout gives intermediaries incentives to pay more for rights
held by owners with stronger claims for compensation. A frivolous
claim for compensation would be worth virtually nothing, because intermediaries would anticipate that if a frivolous claim were randomly
selected for adjudication, it would receive at best a negligible portion
of the fund.11 If there is some circumstance unique to a claimant that
one would expect should lead to a high valuation, then that right
would be more valuable to the intermediary as well. If randomly selected as one of the 1,000, this claim would entitle the intermediary to
a relatively large portion of the fund. An intermediary would thus be
willing to pay more for it. In this climate change compensation hypothetical, a claim sold by a coal miner seems likely to be much more
valuable than the typical food service worker’s, but a worker in the
diner frequented by the miners might receive a value somewhere in

11. Frivolous claims also can be discouraged by charging a fee to submit a claim.
See infra Part I.B.2.
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between. Intermediaries have incentives to consider any facts that
might affect valuation and adjust offers accordingly.
An intermediary would like to pay as little as possible to a claimant for the applicable right, but competition among intermediaries
will drive up the price. Intermediaries perform a task akin to that of
insurance companies12 but in reverse, paying citizens for low-probability windfalls instead of accepting premiums from citizens for lowprobability losses.13 Although significant debate addresses the need
for regulating prices charged by insurance companies,14 a primary justification for regulation in that context lies in consumers’ informational burden in choosing among insurance plans.15 Here, because
nonprice contract terms would not differentiate the intermediaries’
offers, a consumer needs to be concerned only with receiving the highest payment possible, so choosing among offers is not difficult. If the
intermediary market is competitive, claimants should receive approximately the expected value of their claims minus a portion of the intermediaries’ costs in assessing and adjudicating claims. Because intermediaries can hold diversified portfolios and mitigate their risk
exposure in other ways, the randomness inherent in this approach
should not significantly reduce payments.16 Some consumer protection regulation may still be appropriate,17 but the regulatory task is
the comparatively easier one of ensuring that there is sufficient competition in the market.
Random selection does not eliminate the need for individualized
judgments to be made. It just shifts the responsibility for making
12. Insurance companies distribute risk to those better able to bear it. See, e.g.,
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986) (articulating the common framework of American insurance law through an
economic, ethical, and legal lens). The intermediaries serve a similar function, taking
on the risk that claimants would bear, both from the randomization itself and from
inconsistency across decisionmakers in evaluating claims.
13. Another analogy is securitization, by which a holder of a risk asset receives a
certain sum by selling it to the market. See, e.g., Robert Dean Ellis, Securitization Vehicles, Fiduciary Duties, and Bondholders’ Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 295, 299–303 (1999) (discussing the mechanics and benefits of securitization).
14. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 941 (2018) (arguing that rate-setting is not needed under
current market conditions).
15. See, e.g., id. at 980–81; see also Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 394 (2014) (arguing that insurance policies are not sufficiently transparent).
16. See infra Part I.B.4 (explaining how intermediaries can reduce the cost of
risk).
17. See infra Part III.B.
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individualized judgments in most cases from the government agency
to market actors. A plausible argument is that this does not help scale
judgment, but only to disguise judgment. A related critique is that this
form of scaling is a pernicious outsourcing of a core governmental responsibility.18 Government procedures are valuable not simply because they are efficient mechanisms for applying the law to the facts,
but also because they may impart feelings of procedural justice.19 A
citizen denied payment by the government may still perceive procedural justice as a result of the government’s provision of reasons,
while a citizen unable to sell a claim on the market might react differently.20 And finally, it may be more feasible to prevent the government
from engaging in invidious discrimination than it will be to prevent
private actors from doing so.21
These are important criticisms. But they do not defeat the point
that this system drastically reduces the economic cost of adjudication
and therefore makes otherwise impossible administrative schemes
feasible. Even relatively informal, non-adversarial forms of

18. Scholars sometimes worry that privatization will allow legislators to achieve
policy goals that they could not achieve directly through legislation. See, e.g., Jon D.
Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (2010) (examining how privatization “workarounds” allow agencies to achieve policies that would be otherwise
politically unattainable). Others argue that privatization can either advance or hinder
public law values. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291–1314 (2003) (examining the ideological differences in the pragmatic debate over privatization between economic and public law
theorists). In this context, however, the government is unlikely to be able to regulate
by choosing a particular private provider, and ultimate payments of funds will still be
made by the government.
19. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (reviewing theories and research on procedural justice and its implications on legal framework); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (exploring how procedural justice is used to mediate
conflicts between individuals and groups).
20. An analogous question is whether bargaining can support a psychological
recognition of procedural justice. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473 (2008) (examining the role of fairness in bilateral negotiations, finding that procedural justice encourages the acceptance of
negotiated terms); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L.
REV. 407 (2008) (discussing the impact of procedural justice on effective plea bargaining strategy).
21. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify
Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1583 (1998) (noting that private
discrimination may continue in markets after government discrimination has ended).
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government adjudication are subject to procedural norms,22 and government formality has its price.23 Adjudication has a significant minimum cost. This cost makes class actions particularly suitable where
each member of the class has suffered relatively small damages
against private actors, but that mechanism is unavailable when the
claimants are heterogeneous.24 Private actors may be able to consider
relevant evidence in more informal ways, without in-person hearings.
Shifting decision-making from governmental actors to the market via
random selection will be most appropriate when the cost of adjudication per case will be large relative to the amount of money at stake.
This is more likely to be true when an administrative program would
involve a massive number of claims and when adjudication of each
claim involves many separate but interacting issues rather than rote
application of bright-line rules.
The case for using random selection to scale judgment is at its
apex when the question is whether a subsidy should be administered
through random selection or not at all. Why might governmental adjudication sometimes seem off the table as a possible means of administering a standard, as in the example of transitional compensation developed above? At least in principle, it might seem that the
government could relax the formality of government decision-making
as an alternative. The problem is not constitutional law, which allows

22. Even what is technically referred to as “informal administrative adjudication”
is often quite formal. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) imposes no explicit requirements on such adjudication. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107–09 (2003) (discussing the
myriad of actions that comprise informal adjudication under the APA, juxtaposed with
the little direction the APA supplies in regard to these actions). Still, the judiciary imposes ex post constraints on such adjudications. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (insisting that the agency record contain sufficient justification for the decision); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That
Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1057, 1060–69 (2004) (discussing claimants seeking after-the-fact review of an
agency decision via mechanisms within the APA).
23. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual
Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 531 (2006) (“Procedural formality is costly because of the
time, effort, and resources that it requires, and perhaps also because it may trigger
unwelcome external attention.”).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring “questions of law or fact common to the
class”); id. 23(b)(3) (requiring in a damages class action “that the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”).
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for less formality when less is at stake.25 The danger is that less formality may yield more arbitrary governmental decision-making, as
well as arbitrariness’s cousins, corruption and discrimination.26 Like
rules and especially in their absence, procedural protections can increase fairness and consistency.27 So does the law of large numbers,28
but allowing many decisionmakers to vote on each case also escalates
costs. In the example of climate change compensation, an administrative regime that allows claimants to raise any individual circumstance
would almost surely be too cumbersome without random selection,
particularly because avoiding idiosyncratic awards would likely require multiple decisionmakers to consider the facts of each case.
Creating a new bureaucracy to process millions of claims for a legal entitlement that does not already exist would be a challenging feat
of legal engineering if limited to traditional tools. Our existing bureaucracies for processing mass claims, such as the Social Security Administration29 and the Veterans Administration,30 have grown and
evolved over decades, with continuous refinements to both substantive standards and procedures that are specific to the relevant context.31 In principle, a government could hire thousands of new administrative judges and regulation drafters, but in the absence of prior
experience with a similar administrative program, it may be difficult
to anticipate the range of factual and legal issues that will arise. Thus,
25. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (holding that “the degree
of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be
considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process”).
26. See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1633 (2017) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to achieve
formal justice by treating like cases alike, but differences across cases in modern litigation may justify alternative approaches).
27. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Towards Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561, 1571–74 (2003) (recounting the development of rules preventing judges from
using ad hoc procedures).
28. See Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4,
13–15 (2009) (discussing the application of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, which states
“as the number of members in [a] group increases, the probability that a majority vote
of the group is correct tend towards certainty” (citation omitted)).
29. See generally Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (1950– ),
20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (2019) (providing detailed regulations for the administration of Social
Security).
30. See generally Schedule for Rating Disabilities, 38 C.F.R. pt. 4 (2019) (providing
detailed regulations for the administration of veteran benefits).
31. A search of the Federal Register identifies 2,367 documents relating to the Social Security Administration, including roughly a few every new week. See Social Security Administration, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/social
-security-administration [https://perma.cc/E4UK-F5W3].
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developers of a new bureaucracy would be well-advised to build on
existing infrastructure, as for example some advocates of Medicare for
All propose to build on the existing Medicare program.32 But this may
be less feasible when a government program has a goal not closely related to any program, as exemplified by the climate change compensation hypothetical.
Even when fully developed, an agency dedicated to distributing
government funds to large numbers of heterogeneous claimants may
do a poor job of ensuring horizontal equity among claimants. With
decades of improvements and experience, agencies like the Social Security Administration still exhibit large disparities based on which administrative law judge a particular claimant receives.33 The crux of the
challenge is that administrative law judges have significant protections from political interference34 but may have different preferences
about how to resolve cases. An alternative agency design would feature strong political control. If a strong administrator is empowered
to overrule decisions below35 and has discretion to dismiss administrative law judges who decide cases contrary to the administrator’s
goals,36 perhaps greater consistency can be achieved. But that might
offend due process norms37 and create the risk that the program will
32. See Medicare for All Act of 2017, S. 1804, 115th Cong. (2017) (providing for
universal health care by gradually increasing eligibility for Medicare).
33. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals?, REGULATION, Fall 2011, at 34, 36–37 (describing “the growing problem
of ALJ’s unwarranted commitment of billions of dollars to undeserving claimants” and
the Social Security Administration’s inability to address the issue); see also Hearings
and Appeals: ALJ Disposition Data FY 2020, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/
appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.html [https://perma.cc/VVW7-RRVN]
(showing a large disparity in grant rates among ALJs with at least fifty decisions, including 4.9% with grant rates from 20% to 30% and 3.6% with grant rates from 80%
to 90%).
34. See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 806–08
(2013) (describing ALJ protections).
35. Agency heads sometimes but not always may personally review ALJ decisions.
See Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive Departments and Agencies, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 252 (1996) (“Agency officials retained complete authority to review
examiners’ decisions and substitute their own decisions.”).
36. Today, ALJs are removable “only for good cause established and determined
by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
37. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 34, at 821–22 (considering whether political ability to remove ALJs would threaten due process of those appearing before agency). The
Supreme Court has not resolved whether ALJs must be removable by the President.
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010) (“For
similar reasons, our holding also does not address that subset of independent agency
employees who serve as administrative law judges.”).
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shift radically with changes in political administration.38 Yet another
approach to distributing massive number of claims would be devolution, for example in the form of block grants.39 But devolution simply
passes on the challenge of creating a sound administrative structure
to a more local jurisdiction,40 entailing the risk that political commitment will vary not only over time, but also geographically. In short, all
of the standard approaches to scaling mass justice introduce the risk
of inconsistency, whether across administrative law judges, across jurisdictions, or across time. More stringent rules and procedures may
reduce inconsistency on the margins, but only at increased costs.
An administrative program resolving claims by randomly selecting claims purchased by intermediaries would scale judgment with a
fundamentally different approach, so initial experiments ideally
would be on a small scale. Yet one of the proposal’s chief virtues is that
the randomization is straightforward to calibrate. Simply allowing (or
requiring) claim sales and instituting random selection ensures that
the intermediaries will have robust incentives to predict how cases
will be valued if selected for random adjudication.41 Administration
does not require the creation of a large bureaucracy. Some mechanism
for filing claims and for registering changes of ownership, such as a
website,42 is needed. Then, enough judges must be appointed to
38. Administrative agencies are sometimes permitted to change course for reasons of political preference, but they must provide nonpolitical justifications for doing
so. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2009) (“[A]gencies, courts, and scholars alike generally seem
to have accepted the view that influences coming from one political branch or another
cannot be allowed to explain administrative decisionmaking, even if such factors are
influencing agency decisionmaking.”).
39. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements,
and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297
(1996) (offering a critical assessment of these techniques).
40. One might argue for devolution on the ground that states are more likely to
experiment than the federal government and that state agencies can learn from other
states’ experiences. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“[A]
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Some scholars, however, argue that in fact states engage in relatively little experimentation. See,
e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (answering the title’s question mostly in the negative); Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2018) (arguing that the federal government can serve as a locus of
experimentation).
41. It is possible, however, to increase or decrease intermediaries’ incentives to
invest in claim screening. See infra Part I.A.2.
42. As the experience with the Affordable Care Act demonstrates, creation of a
website to be used at such scale is not a trivial task. See Alexander B. Howard, What
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enable careful, thoughtful adjudication of the relatively small number
of claims that are randomly selected; if judges are appointed for reasonably long terms, the profile of the average jurist may not shift all
that much with political winds. Critically, it will not matter if the total
number of underlying claims grows or shrinks. Perhaps the government would wish to increase the number of decisionmakers and adjudicated cases somewhat if the agency’s mission expands. But this is
nowhere near the challenge of scaling an administrative agency that
must give individualized attention to every case. A problem with some
systems of mass justice is that claims can take years to process.43 The
market approach has no need for queuing, and claimants can receive
their payouts as quickly as they can negotiate with intermediaries.
The idea of using random selection in the way this Article proposes is new, but the prospect of randomly selecting cases for adjudication has received some attention.44 First, Shay Lavie has described
a mechanism called “reverse sampling” to distribute proceeds in successful small claims class action cases.45 The problem that Lavie addresses is that of the class action with a large number of potential
claimants, each entitled to only a small amount of damages.46 Such
cases present the challenge of how to distribute the damages paid by
the defendant.47 If the administrative costs of distributing the damages are high relative to the damages themselves, then either the defendant must pay too much or the plaintiffs receive too little relative
to hypothetical full compensation.48 Courts sometimes award cy pres
damages,49 but plaintiffs might then receive no benefit at all. Lavie
Went Wrong at Healthcare.gov?, DIGIPHILE (Dec. 1, 2013), http://digiphile.wordpress
.com/2013/10/17/what-went-wrong-at-healthcare-gov [http://perma.cc/7479
-B6JD] (describing the factors that led to the Healthcare.gov’s failure at relaunch on
October 1).
43. See, e.g., Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process,
90 NEB. L. REV. 388, 389–92 (2011) (documenting multiple years’ delays in resolving
veterans’ benefits issues).
44. Random sampling has also been used to provide evidence within cases. See
Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 297 (2011) (discussing the possibility of using statistical methods to handle mass tort cases efficiently). For example, a prosecution of a doctor for Medicare fraud relied on an analysis
of a random sample of patient records. Id. at 303.
45. Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the Proceeds of
Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1069–74 (2011).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1067.
48. Id.
49. See generally Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 97 (2014) (discussing cy pres awards in class action suits).
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suggests distributing the damages among class members chosen at
random, thus reducing the total administrative costs of distribution.50
A recent Supreme Court oral argument on cy pres awards considered
the feasibility of this approach.51 A limitation is that Lavie assumes
that the relative damages of each plaintiff is known in advance and
thus ignores the possibility that relative draws on the fund could be
determined through adjudications in randomly selected cases.52 This
Article extends the Lavie approach, arguing that it can work with
claims requiring valuation, so long as claimants sell the claims to intermediaries.
Second, some commentators have argued that “statistical adjudication” could be used to resolve claims of heterogeneous class members.53 With statistical adjudication, the courts would adjudicate a
small percentage of randomly selected claims,54 and the remaining
claimants, instead of having their days in court, would have their
claims resolved based on statistical models.55 A class member would
be assigned a higher value, the greater the damages received by similarly situated claimants among the adjudicated claims. If the claims in
the class action are sufficiently homogeneous, the plaintiff for each remaining claim may receive the average of the adjudicated claims.56 Advocates of statistical adjudication do not view the mechanism as an
50. Lavie, supra note 45, at 1068.
51. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (No.
17-961) (“Isn’t it always better to at least have a lottery system, then, that one of the
plaintiffs, one of the injured parties gets it, rather than someone who’s not injured?”).
The Court did not reach the merits of the cy pres issue. Frank, 139 S. Ct. 1041.
52. Lavie, supra note 45.
53. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 580 (1993) (exploring adjudication by
sampling to handle large scale adjudication and illustrates how “at some point along
the heterogeneity-homogeneity continuum, aggregation ceases to improve the accuracy”); Alexandra Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 626 (2012)
(explaining how “reasons for variation are ‘noise’ rather than the effect of legally relevant variables that ought to have been taken into account” when case outcomes are
heterogenous); Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815,
837 (1992) (“At some point along the heterogeneity-homogeneity continuum, aggregation ceases to improve the accuracy of traditional trials and becomes a vitiation.”);
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
969, 981 (2007) (illustrating the importance of sample size instead of focusing on homogeneous class members).
54. See Bone, supra note 53, at 565 (discussing the process demonstrated by the
Cimino court).
55. See id. (discussing how the Cimino process would impact remaining asbestos
cases).
56. See, e.g., id. at 577–84.
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inferior substitute for actual adjudication57 The statistical model, they
suggest, can produce more accurate and more consistent results, because the statistical recoveries are based on an expectation of damages that averages what idiosyncratic judges or juries might decide in
any particular case.58 A problem, however, is that statistical adjudication itself requires some procedure for resolving contested coding of
different claims. The random selection mechanism described here,
though immediately applicable to administrative proceedings rather
than class actions, avoids the need for the government to conduct any
statistical analysis or determine which cases are most similar to one
another.
Third, David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell have suggested what
they frame as a simple method to reduce litigation costs in general
civil litigation.59 Only half of unsettled cases60 would be selected for
adjudication. Damages in these cases would be twice as high as they
otherwise would be, and defendants in other cases would owe nothing.61 This mechanism is closer to the market mechanism described
here, in that random selection is coupled with proportionately higher
damages. The damages that a plaintiff expects to receive on average
or that a defendant expects to pay on average in the RosenbergShavell mechanism is roughly equal to the damages in the absence of
the mechanism.62 The average cost of trial is, however, reduced, because fewer trials occur.63 With our mechanism, though, claims are
sold, so every claimant still can receive some recovery. Because of this,
much higher multipliers and thus much greater cost savings are possible. Rosenberg and Shavell do not generalize their mechanism to allow 1 in N cases to be selected for N times the damages.64 Perhaps they
57. See id. at 566 (listing scholars who advocate for statistical adjudication).
58. See, e.g., Saks & Blanck, supra note 53, at 851 (explaining how statistical adjudication helps to “increase accuracy” and “reduce bias”); Lahav, supra note 53, at 612–
18 (arguing that statistical adjudication promotes “outcome equality” by treating similar cases more consistently).
59. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal To Halve Litigation
Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2005).
60. The randomization would occur immediately after filing. See id. at 1727. Thus,
settlement would need to occur before filing.
61. Id. at 1731.
62. Id. at 1730.
63. Rosenberg and Shavell anticipate that their proposal would promote settlement. Id. at 1727–28 (noting that risk aversion should increase settlement, though the
elimination of all litigation costs in half of the cases reduces pressure to settle).
64. The possibility of basing governmental decision-making on random selection
with some other probability clearly would have occurred to Rosenberg, who in another
coauthored article considers random selection of administrative enforcement. See
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believed that higher N would be infeasible, for example because defendants might be less likely to be able to pay the judgment.65 When
the government is payor and claimants can sell their rights, however,
virtually any level of N can be achieved.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes choices associated with the design of random selection: whether the fund to be distributed should be fixed or based on judicial valuations, whether claim
sales should be required or optional, how many claims should be selected, how to deal with problems associated with very small or very
large claims, and how to reduce the risk associated with the random
selection mechanism. The design of the system of adjudication in randomly selected cases is the focus of Part II. Especially in the absence
of detailed regulations, it is critical that decisionmakers have ample
time to attend to details, because details that intermediaries expect
decisionmakers to ignore will have no effect on claim values. Part II
also discusses the incentives of various participants in the valuation
process: the claimants, the adversaries selected to argue against the
claimants, and the judges themselves. Then, Part III offers some preliminary analysis of consumer protection. The core protection for consumers is the incentive that intermediaries will have to compete
against one another. Traditional tools like antitrust, consumer protection, and antidiscrimination law might bolster competition.
Finally, Part IV applies the random selection approach to various
regulatory schemes. Several of these seek to direct government
spending to prevent climate change. Climate change is a useful illustration of the power of random selection because legal rules designed
to address it economy-wide present a challenge of distributing resources at a scale beyond even that of our most extensive existing administrative programs. Moreover, some plausible legislative goals are
easy to state in principle yet hard to implement in rules.66 These are
precisely the circumstances in which random selection markets might
be especially useful. Three different forms of compensation funds (for
Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & David Rosenberg, A New Model of Administrative Enforcement,
93 VA. L. REV. 1983 (2007) (introducing single-outcome sampling, where regulators
randomly select one of the sources of risk, determine liability, and apply the outcome
as determinative of liability at all of the sources).
65. An avenue for future research is to generalize the Rosenberg-Shavell mechanism to higher damage multipliers by requiring (or at least allowing) plaintiffs to sell
claims and by requiring defendants to insure their claims.
66. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1187 (2009) (explaining
how the long-term implementation of climate change will continue to be impeded despite enacting appropriate legislation).
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costs associated with climate change mitigation, for expenses associated with improving energy efficiency, and for climate change-related
research and development) are described. The Article also considers
how random selection might be used to distribute damages of a disaster, using the current novel coronavirus pandemic as an example that
anticipates future challenges, whether from climate change, other
pandemics, or entirely unexpected emergencies. It argues that a governmental damages fund distributed in this way might be less easily
exploited by fraudsters and special interests than funds distributed
through a more traditional structure. It also explains that random selection markets can be created quite quickly and can save the legislature the challenge of making difficult decisions about how relief funds
should be distributed.
I. THE RANDOM SELECTION MECHANISM
Suppose that Congress were to create a “Goodness and Niceness
Commission,” to borrow Gary Lawson’s hypothetical example of a generic administrative agency that we would not really want,67 with the
mission of subsidizing acts of goodness and niceness. Using the Social
Security Administration model to accomplish this goal would be challenging, to say the least. Extensive regulations defining acts that qualify for a subsidy payment would be needed to reduce disparity among
decisions by the many thousands of agency officials who would need
to be hired to adjudicate cases. With the random selection model defined in the Introduction, the task is relatively simple. Anyone with evidence of having performed an act of goodness or niceness could submit documentation of that act to a website and then sell rights to any
payment. The Commission would adjudicate some tiny fraction of
cases and divide the government’s entire subsidy among them. The
greater the subsidy, the more intermediaries would pay for claims and
the more effort they would put into distinguishing strong claims from
weak ones.
The Commission might still be a horrific idea, but it would not be
administratively infeasible. The randomization mechanism saves the
government from the task of assessing every detail of every claim. The
government’s initial role is the much simpler one of serving as repository for recording initial claims and transfers of those claims to intermediaries. This might be accomplished with a website,68 serving as a
67. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1239 (1994).
68. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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user interface allowing users to store information in the underlying
database. Perhaps in the future, a decentralized solution such as a
blockchain might be used.69 Most of the information in claims could be
anonymous, but claimants must at least register their ID, such as Social Security number, to prevent duplicate claims,70 as well as some
proof that the filing was authorized.71 This Article will not discuss
these implementation issues in any further detail. Rather, this Article
will focus on the foundational structure of the mechanism, specifically
the rules governing claim payouts, addressed in Section A, and the
random selection itself, addressed in Section B. The principles are applicable regardless of the agency’s mission, so the Commission can
serve as a stand-in for any agency primarily dedicated to spending
government money.
A. DEFINING RULES ON CLAIM SALES AND PAYOUTS
We have assumed so far that the government would distribute a
fixed fund to the owners of randomly selected claims, but it would also
be possible to leave the total payout amount undefined. Subsection 1
explains why the fixed fund will generally be preferable, and Subsection 2 introduces variants of both mechanisms that would allow the
government to reduce or increase the incentive of intermediaries to
investigate claims thoroughly. Then, Subsection 3 explains why it
likely makes sense to require claim sales, rather than merely making
such sales optional.

69. Some have argued that the blockchain is particularly useful where transparency is needed to prevent corruption. See, e.g., Jesse Marks, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Corruption: The Killer App?, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 62 (2018)
(“Since records in properly run DLTs can never be deleted, the DLT can help to prevent
other officials from extracting bribes to make the problem ‘go away.’”).
70. If a single individual is permitted to file duplicate claims, for example for multiple acts of goodness and niceness, then when a claim is selected, the adjudicators will
need to consider all other claims registered under the same Social Security number. If
a claim for the same underlying act is filed multiple times, the adjudicators could divide
any award by the number of times the claim was filed. See infra Part I.B.3. Alternatively,
redundant filings could lead to disqualification.
71. The goal of this requirement is to prevent harassment stemming from filing
under someone else’s identity. Cf. Pippa Browde, Many Unhappy Returns: The Need for
Increased Tax Penalties for Identity Theft-Based Refund Fraud, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 53
(2015) (discussing problems of identity theft in taxation). For example, a video in
which the person is filmed authorizing the claim could be used. The key is that the
government only needs to verify authenticity in the small percentage of cases selected
for adjudication. Perhaps more important than the ability to prove that one’s claim is
valid is the ability to post evidence that another claim purportedly on one’s behalf is
not authorized.
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1. Fixed Fund vs. Variable Payouts
In the variable payout alternative to the fixed fund,72 the government would pay to the holder of each randomly selected claim the valuation amount divided by the probability of random selection. As a result, the government’s total liability would be uncertain. Such an
approach may be advisable if the government believes it important to
give full compensation to each claimant, rather than having the
amount of compensation vary depending on the number of claimants.
This might be appropriate if it is unclear how many claimants are
likely to participate. In addition, it might reduce claimant risk attributable to uncertainty about how many other applicants will seek funds.
Finally, this approach is useful if a legislature would like a program to
be able to scale from year to year without further need for the legislature to change the size of the subsidy fund.
Yet there is a strong argument that the total monetary commitment to a particular program should be up to the legislature, especially
if money is to be distributed based on a vague standard rather than
detailed rules. Our Goodness and Niceness Commission hypothetical
might be silly, but it would be even sillier for a government to delegate
to the Commission unlimited authority to determine just how much
goodness and niceness ought to be subsidized. The legislature would
still affect the total award payment amount, but that effect would arise
in the selection of judges, thus politicizing the judge selection process.
If the agenda of the Commission is politicized, then random selection
might reduce disparities at any particular time but increase disparity
over time, depending on which party controls the legislature. Politics
should determine relative governmental priorities. But if adjudication
is just a battle between judges who want to grant high and low awards,
the system will perform less well at distinguishing between claims.
With a fixed fund, the focus would be on selecting judges who will
make appropriate comparisons between claims.
Intermediate possibilities exist. The government could, for example, provide that the total payout will equal the sum of valuations, but
constrained to some minimum and maximum. Or, the government
could set total compensation as a function of the total number of
72. The fixed versus variable payout problem is an instance of the more general
choice between bounded and unbounded institutions. See Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE L.J. 248 (2014). An example is that the National Science Foundation
is a bounded institution, with a fixed amount of money to distribute. See id. at 358–59.
This is especially attractive if the fund distributor may have different preferences from
the legislature. See id. at 358 (noting that the NSF might have greater “‘pro-science’
leanings relative to Congress”).
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claimants. Or, the government could provide for a fixed fund, but provide some formula determining whether the fixed amount should
change over time. The formula might, for example, increase the
amount if the population increases. The formula for the fixed fund
might even depend in part on judicial valuations, so that if the valuations suggest claimants are being shortchanged, the fund will increase
at least somewhat in the next period.
2. Whole Fund vs. Partial Fund Payouts
Whether a fixed fund or variable payouts are used, we have assumed above that the only money that claimants would receive for
their claims would be from the intermediary. A variant approach
would be for the government to give claimants money proportional to
the amount received from intermediaries. With a fixed fund, for example, the government might distribute some portion of the fixed fund
among all claimants, or with variable payouts, the amount distributed
might be a preset multiplier (say, two or three) of intermediary payments. The purpose of such an approach would be to reduce the total
stakes for intermediaries and thus, reduce their investments. If, for example, half of the government subsidy is distributed in this way, with
the other half distributed to intermediaries in the usual way, then intermediaries will only have half as much at stake. And so, they should
be expected to devote less time overall to claim assessment and fewer
resources to the ultimate adjudications.
Whether this is appropriate depends on the trade-off between
two goals: minimizing administrative costs and pricing claims accurately. The higher the proportion of total payments to be distributed
by the government to claimants in proportion to the amounts received
from intermediaries, the less intermediaries will have at stake. The result will be reduced administrative costs and a higher ratio of money
received by claims to money spent by the government. A complication
is that such a scheme introduces the danger of side payments; a claimant might bribe an intermediary to increase official payment, and the
government would need to police such bribery. The lower the proportion, on the other hand, the more intermediaries will have at stake,
resulting in greater accuracy. In principle, the government could even
achieve greater accuracy (at greater expense) than the baseline, by
taxing intermediaries on payments to claimants and adding the taxes
paid to the fund to be distributed back to intermediaries. The rest of
the Article, however, will assume that there are no taxes and no
matching payments, though of course the legislature could change this
over time depending on its initial experience.
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3. Allowing vs. Requiring Claim Sales
We assumed above that claimants would be required to sell their
claims to a genuine intermediary. A simple way of enforcing this
would be to limit random selection to intermediaries owning at least
some number of claims corresponding to different claimants (perhaps
1,000). One might reasonably argue, however, that claim sales ought
not be required. An individual who wishes to hold onto a lottery ticket,
the argument goes, should be able to save the administrative costs of
the claim sale. Indeed, if the public understands the point of the mechanism, this would do little harm and could perhaps save some administrative costs if claims are for very small values.73 But a requirement
that claimants sell claims reinforces the point that the random selection system is not intended to be a government lottery, but a market
for claims. In addition, if sale is not required, the market will be subject
to adverse selection,74 as someone’s willingness to sell a claim might
be seen as an indication that the claim is of low quality.75 A requirement that claims be sold eliminates this adverse selection problem,
because intermediaries would understand that a claimant was selling
because of the requirement to do so.
B. SELECTING CLAIMS FOR ADJUDICATION
Claims would be selected for adjudication at random, with each
claim having an equal chance of being selected. One task for the government would be to conduct this random selection. Governments often conduct lotteries in other contexts,76 such as where a limited

73. When the administrative costs of selling a claim are close to the claim value,
then it probably makes sense for individuals simply to hold onto their claims. In this
case, the proposal here becomes close to Lavie’s reverse sampling proposal. See Lavie,
supra note 45, at 1073–75. The difference is that different claimants’ lottery tickets
would have different values if randomly selected for adjudication.
74. See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS.
L.J. 29, 44–61 (2012) (discussing the problem of adverse selection in the insurance
market).
75. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (modeling this phenomenon in the market
for used cars).
76. One of the most infamous was the government’s draw of numbers determining draft order for the Vietnam War. Subsequent analysis suggested that the lottery
was not random, as men born late in the year had a lower probability of being selected.
Norton Starr, Nonrandom Risk: The 1970 Draft Lottery, 5 J. STAT. EDUC. (1997), http://
jse.amstat.org/v5n2/datasets.starr.html [https://perma.cc/GQ88-AVFL].
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number of seats are available in a desired school,77 so this is relatively
straightforward. If the government were to use a blockchain to store
claims, it could make the random selection particularly transparent to
prevent concerns about corruption.78 If there were worries that a
pseudo-random number generator would be insufficiently random,
the government could use quantum random number generation.79
These techniques are hardly necessary—the government could just
use Excel80—but their availability highlights that the government
should be able to choose random numbers.
1. Number of Claims
But how many claims should be adjudicated? Because the only
purpose of the adjudication is to provide incentives for intermediaries, in principle the government could choose as few as two claims. It
would then adjudicate each and divide the entire fund between those
two claims. For example, if Claim A were adjudicated to have a value
twice Claim B’s, then Claim A would receive two-thirds of the entire
subsidy. Assuming intermediaries had correctly anticipated the selection and valuations of these claims and that there was sufficient competition among intermediaries, then Claim A would have been purchased for about twice the price paid for Claim B. Claims more
valuable than A would earn more in the market than A, and claims less
valuable than B would earn less than B.
There may, however, be good reasons to adjudicate considerably
more than two claims. One reason is mathematical. When a fund is distributed to just two randomly selected claims, a claim will not quite be
expected to receive exactly its value proportional to all other claims.
Rather, small claims will receive considerably more, and large claims
will receive considerably less. The reason is that if two small claims
are the only ones selected, each will receive precisely half the fund, the
same amount that two large claims selected would receive. Indeed, if
claims’ true values are perfectly anticipated and are uniformly distributed from zero up to some maximum, the lowest value claims might
receive almost six times their value, while the highest value claims are
77. For a critique of the fairness of this approach, see Carol Necole Brown, Casting
Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 65,
414–24 (2005).
78. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Quantum Random Numbers, ANU QRNG, https://qrng.anu.edu.au
[https://perma.cc/5PG2-36J8] (measuring “the quantum fluctuations of the vacuum”).
80. See How to Generate Random Numbers in Excel, TRUMPEXCEL.COM, https://
trumpexcel.com/generate-random-numbers-excel [https://perma.cc/89BB-Z9H9]
(providing a tutorial on how to generate random numbers in Excel).
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worth only about 70% of their value.81 The situation is even more dire
if there are many small claims and few large ones.82 If, however, 100
claims are sampled, the situation is much better.83 The larger the number of claims sampled, the closer approximation of the sampling distribution to the underlying distribution. If the underlying distribution
were known, then it would be possible to adjust for this, but this seems
unlikely.84 Thus, the goal should be to adjudicate enough claims to ensure at least that market valuations are not systematically distorted
by much.
A second reason is legal. If adjudication results in written opinions, then more adjudications will produce a greater number of precedents. But, as we will see below,85 it is not obvious that precedents
improve the operation of the random selection scheme. If we assume
that there is some benefit to production of precedents, that must be
balanced against the cost of adjudication to determine an appropriate
number of cases to adjudicate. In any event, the proportion of cases
that must be reviewed is likely to be relatively small, certainly far
fewer than in a regime with appeal as of right. Moreover, the legislature creating such a regime may choose a fixed number of adjudications for each period, rather than some set percentage. If 100 adjudications suffice when 10 million file demands for compensation for
their goodness and niceness,86 then that number should also work in
an even better and nicer society resulting in 100 million claims. This
administrative scheme can scale without hiring substantial additional
personnel, though perhaps benefits of precedents would make some
81. This was calculated from a simple model in which two claims are sampled
from 1,000 claims. With sampling repeated a billion times, the lowest value claim
earned on average 6.46 times its value, while the highest value claim earned 0.693 of
its value. For the code that produced this calculation, see mbabramo/ClaimSampleModel, GITHUB, https://github.com/mbabramo/ClaimSampleModel [https://perma
.cc/2T7J-FSDU].
82. We defined the claims as having true values ranging from 100,000i/1001 for 1
<= i <= 1000. Again sampling 10 million times, the lowest claim received 1,026 times
its true value, while the highest claim received only 0.164 of its true value. See id.
83. With a uniform distribution of claims, the lowest claim received 1.01 times its
true value; the highest, 0.993 of its true value. With the asymmetric distribution defined in the previous footnote, the lowest claim received 1.058 times its true value; the
highest, 0.947.
84. The distribution might be estimated based on payments for insurance on random selection. See infra Part I.B.4. But even with actuarially fair rates, some intermediaries might not insure some claims, and perhaps small claims would disproportionately not be insured. Therefore, it is difficult to know the distribution of claims in
advance.
85. See infra Part II.A.3.
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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scale desirable. The months—or years—long backlog inherent in
other agency decisions would not be an issue. The legislature’s only
recurring decision then becomes how great the subsidy should be in
each period, assuming that the subsidy is fixed.87
2. Filing Fees
Because the system scales so easily, it can handle claims both
large and small. When a small claim is randomly selected, the intermediaries will likely not spend as much to persuade the decisionmakers
that it is high value, since less overall is at stake. The adjudicators presumably would not spend as much time on it either. But the adjudicators likely would try to ensure that small claims receive proportional
payouts relative to one another and that the ratios of payouts between
large and small claims reflect their merits. Still, a concern might be
that too many small or even frivolous claims would be filed. The rules,
as stated so far, mean that there is little reason not to sell a claim. A
problem with this is that in the random sample of adjudications, small
claims might dominate large ones. This exacerbates the problem
above, that absent a large pool of cases to adjudicate, small claims
might receive higher payouts than they deserve. Moreover, the social
costs associated with filing small claims might exceed the social benefits.
There is, however, a simple solution. The government could discourage claimants from filing small claims by requiring a filing fee. If,
for example, the government intends the Goodness and Niceness Commission to reward acts like building soup kitchens rather than acts like
stopping at a pedestrian crosswalk, it might insist on a filing fee of, say,
$10,000. The money from the filing fees would be added to the overall
pool, so it would not reduce the net subsidy. But it would deter small
claims. If the market expects a valuation for a claim significantly below
that threshold, then no intermediary would want to buy that claim.
This is not without its downsides, as subsidies would effectively be
distributed proportional to assessed value over $10,000, instead of
distributed proportional to assessed value. This slightly overvalues
large claims relative to smaller ones, a tendency that works in the opposite direction of the distortion described above.88 A variant on the
filing fee approach would increase each claim valued at an amount
above the filing fee by the amount of the filing fee. Thus, if one were
sure that one had a claim that would be valued at $20,000 and one
87. See supra Part I.A.1.
88. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.

1366

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1345

paid a $10,000 filing fee, one would expect to receive approximately
$30,000 back on average for a net gain of $20,000, but someone with
a claim valued at $5,000 would expect on average a $5,000 loss.
3. Subdivided Claims
The flip-side problem is the danger that small claims will receive
too high a proportion of the subsidy relative to a very small number of
very strong claims. Suppose, for example, that the vast majority of a
fund really should go to a single person or entity.89 If there are millions
of very small claims, then the chance of this claim being selected is low,
and so it will be undercompensated. For example, if only 100 claims
of 100,000,000 were to be selected, then the best any claim can hope
for is to receive all of the fund if selected, producing an expected
amount of only one millionth of the fund. There is, however, an easy
solution. A claimant should be able to divide its right to compensation
into shares, with each share having the same probability of being selected for random adjudication as any undivided claim. Then, if one
such claim were randomly selected for adjudication, the resulting valuation would be divided by the number of shares. For example, if a
claimant with an undivided claim would have received a $100 million
valuation but breaks the claim into 100 shares, then a single share, if
randomly selected, would receive a valuation of $1,000,000. This approach could be used in conjunction with filing fees90 to discourage
excess subdividing.
4. Insurance for Nonselection
Another virtue of claim subdivision is that it serves an insurance
function. The intermediary who holds a valuable claim faces a substantial risk that the claim might not be randomly selected for adjudication. Yet even with subdivision, the intermediary would retain substantial risk. Fortunately, there is a better way of greatly reducing the
risk cost of the random selection device: The government could offer,
at actuarially fair rates, insurance that would pay off if a claim is not
randomly selected.91 Suppose, for example, that an intermediary
89. See, e.g., EDWARD MONKTON, THE PIG OF HAPPINESS (2007) (describing a community in which a single individual’s efforts greatly increase goodness and niceness). This
may be more obvious with some of our later proposals. For example, if the government’s goal is to reward climate change innovation, then it is possible (though unlikely) that a single inventor will end up deserving most of the fund. See infra Part
IV.A.3.
90. See infra Part IV.A.2.
91. For a similar proposal, see Michael Abramowicz, Tax Experimentation, 71 FLA.
L. REV. 65, 103–04 (2019).
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holds a claim that, if all claims were adjudicated, would receive
$100,000. But because of the random selection function, the claim has
a one in one thousand chance of being randomly selected, in which
case it will be worth $100,000,000. The intermediary could then put
up a bond for $99,900,000, which would be forfeited to the government in the event the case is randomly selected; the other 99.9% of
the time, the government would pay $100,000. This entirely eliminates the intermediary’s risk. Meanwhile, because the government
should be risk neutral,92 this should be a service that it can cheaply
provide.93
Admittedly, that is a high bond to put up, and it would not be practical for an intermediary with thousands of claims to put up a bond
that high on each claim. By holding a diversified portfolio, an intermediary has already hedged risk; this illustrates the capacity of the capital markets to reduce risk.94 The intermediary could then further reduce risk by buying an insurance product that reflects the risk that it
will have bad luck, in the sense that the random selection will be of
claims with lower expected value for the intermediary than would occur on average. An intermediary might accomplish this by self-assessing the value of each of its claims. This makes it straightforward
to calculate the expected value of its portfolio, given random selection.
The contract could then provide that if the random selection implies a
significantly greater expected value (that is, the intermediary benefited from the luck of the draw), the intermediary would forfeit a bond
to the government, while if random selection implies a significantly
92. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1666 & nn.162–64 (2016) (citing
sources assuming government risk neutrality). Governmental officials sometimes act
to avert risk, leading to policy that fails to take advantage of government risk neutrality. See id. at 1666–67. In principle, however, the government should be able to accept
fairly large, actuarially-fair bets while imposing virtually zero risk on individual taxpayers.
93. Alternatively, the private sector could provide such insurance. A standard argument for private insurance instead of governmentally provided insurance is that the
government may use private insurance to achieve social objectives that are better pursued outside an insurance system, and thus that private insurance is more likely to be
actuarially sound. See, e.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 569 n.304 (1983). But there may be economies of scope in governmental administration, because the government is administering the fund. Meanwhile,
there is no actuarial challenge here, because what is being administered is a random
number function.
94. An intermediary also might take advantage of capital markets to reduce risk
in other ways, for example by selling shares to the public. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Legal
Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 1978 (2013) (“Diversification is the best protection investors have from the risks of capital investment.”).
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lower expected value, the government would pay money to the intermediary. Though this is modestly more complex, because such contracts would depend entirely on random selection (rather than on the
ultimate results of adjudications), the government can offer perfectly
actuarially fair contracts, thus reducing the risk from random selection. From the government’s perspective, it does not matter whether
the intermediary self-assesses correctly. In principle, each intermediary’s incentive would be to insure up to the point where it would be
indifferent how the random selection turns out.95
Random selection, however, is not the only source of risk for intermediaries. Risk cannot be altogether eliminated because of the uncertainty inherent in valuation.96 Some decisionmakers might value a
claim higher than others, creating risk, and even the distribution of
how different decisionmakers would value a claim may be unknown,
creating uncertainty.97 In cases randomly selected for adjudication,
the stakes will be very high, far higher than if every case were adjudicated. On the other hand, valuation risk is eliminated in the cases not
randomly selected for adjudication, and we have seen above that the
risk associated with random selection itself can be insured against.
The question thus arises of which imposes a greater economic burden:
valuation risk in every case, or n times the valuation risk in one-of-n
cases? The answer may be the latter, but the difference may not be so
great. Valuation risk associated with a claim is largely unsystematic
risk, meaning that it is uncorrelated with other risks.98 Finance theory
tells us that unsystematic risk can be eliminated if held as part of a
diversified portfolio.99 With higher n, an unsystematic risk amounts to
95. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362–63 (1988) (noting that when the price of insurance is
actuarially fair, consumers will buy sufficient insurance so that the consumer is indifferent between states of the world).
96. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 22–48 (1921).
97. Id. In Donald Rumsfeld’s famous typology, the concern here is still with known
unknowns, rather than unknown unknowns. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def.,
& Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Remarks at Department of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636 [https://perma.cc/D9GV-W6U5] (distinguishing
these from known knowns). Known unknowns at least can be estimated.
98. Per B. Mokkelbost, Unsystematic Risk over Time, 6 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 785, 785 (1971) (defining “unsystematic risk or variation” as “variation due to attributes of individual securities”).
99. See generally EDWIN J. ELTON, MARTIN J. GRUBER, STEPHEN J. BROWN & WILLIAM N.
GOETZMANN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 313 (9th ed. 2014)
(“[E]ven if an individual asset had a great deal of unsystematic risk, it would have little
impact on portfolio risk, and therefore, unsystematic risk would not require a higher
return.”).
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a greater portion of a market-basket portfolio, but this has only a tiny
effect on overall diversification. Just as the intermediary’s pooling of
claims reduces risk, so too can the market further diversify risk. A
hedge fund might invest in an intermediary, for example, because its
risk is idiosyncratic, much as hedge funds may invest in litigation.100
Or an intermediary can sell shares to the public, thus accomplishing
further diversification.
II. ADJUDICATION OF RANDOMLY SELECTED CLAIMS
Once a case is selected for adjudication, the stakes will be high. If,
for example, only one in 1,000 claims is adjudicated, the expected
value of the claim will be 1,000 times what it was before random selection. It is the expectation of this occasional high payoff that gives
intermediaries incentives ex ante to bid claims up. Litigation expenses
will be higher with such a claim than would be the case if no multiplier
were applied, but the litigation expenses will be borne far less often.
Because litigation expenses rise less than proportionately to the value
of adjudication,101 this mechanism reduces expected litigation expenses. In competitive markets, intermediaries will bid up to expected
claim value less expenses, so random selection’s reduction of expected
litigation expenses means that claimants will receive more than they
would if every claim were adjudicated.
This Part addresses what the adjudication process would look
like, considering how random selection might change the way that litigation is conducted. Section A examines how expert and other evidence might be considered, how to ensure full development of arguments against claimants, and whether the outcome binding on
claimants before a multi-judge tribunal should be that of the average
or median judge. It also explains that because the goal is to provide
predictability to the public, rather than predictability to litigants,
precedent should play less of a role. Section B describes the incentives
of various participants. Because claimants have already been paid by
intermediaries, they may need some incentive to encourage their full
participation in litigation—and to hold them accountable should they
100. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 1169, 1211–12 (2011) (noting similarity of litigation funding to hedge
fund investing).
101. This is implicit in the oft-noted point that “small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). The ratio of litigation costs to damages is
higher for small claims suits than for suits with high stakes.
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have engaged in fraud when selling their claims. Meanwhile, this Part
also considers the role of adversaries, whose function is to argue
against claimants, and of judges.
A. STRUCTURE OF THE PROCESS
This Section considers the structure of adjudication from start to
finish and beyond.
1. Consideration of Evidence
Adjudication is the occasion for careful consideration in the context of specific facts how to measure relative desert—in the case of our
generic hypothetical example, what counts as “goodness and niceness”102—that is, how much credit an individual might receive for different acts, and how to address evidentiary uncertainties or disagreements among experts. In this sense, the adjudications function in the
manner and spirit of the common law.103 The process thus flips the
typical regulatory script, under which most of the identification of relevant distinctions occurs when regulations are crafted rather than
when adjudication is performed. To be sure, the Goodness and Niceness Commission could enact regulations that would resolve issues
large and small.104 But the challenge to which random selection responds is the creation of an administrative program in which we assume that full development of regulations is not practical, because
there are too many factual scenarios or because it is too difficult to
assign weights to various scenarios.105 We thus assume that the
102. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
103. J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 362–
63 (2019) (defining common law as legal rights and duties derived from judicial opinions).
104. See supra note 3.
105. In the criminal context, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines serve as a useful reminder that the most ambitious attempts to create rules to convert acts (e.g., crimes)
into numbers (e.g., prison sentences) fall short. The Guidelines recognize their own
incompleteness by allowing upward and downward departures. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–5K3.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Critics long argued that the Guidelines are too constraining even with the departure mechanism. See KATE STITH & JOSE
A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 143–78
(1998). Perhaps in part because of these critiques, the Guidelines today are merely advisory. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Unsurprisingly, Booker
has led to increased inter-judge disparity in sentencing. See Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from
Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1272–73 (2014). Similarly, in distributing funds using
a conventional administrative regime, the government may reduce disparity or may
grant flexibility to take all factors into account, but not both.
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agency acts under a broad standard or at least that the enacted regulations leave considerable room for discretion.
What types of arguments should judges consider in ex post proceedings? One answer is any kind of factual evidence or legal consideration relevant in an ideal world of perfect and costless adjudication.
In determining how much to offer for particular claims, intermediaries will consider any information that they anticipate judges will consider, unless the cost to the intermediaries of considering such information even informally is too high. If an intermediary believes that a
judge would consider a factor to be relevant even tangentially, then
the intermediary will have an incentive to adjust its offer for the claim
up or down. If judges were expected not to consider certain factors as
too tangential, the intermediaries would not consider them either, so
pricing would be a less nuanced reflection of underlying merit. Thus,
in our hypothetical, judges should consider any specific circumstances
that someone would ordinarily weigh in considering how “good and
nice” someone’s acts were, even if hypothetical regulators trying ex
ante to create a catalogue of relevant considerations would never even
think of such a consideration.
On the other hand, even if a judge believes some consideration to
be marginally relevant in theory, the judge reasonably might decide to
assign it no weight. Perhaps the judge is confident that each intermediary would view the cost of considering such evidence to exceed the
benefits in determining how much to bid for a claim. Because of the
multiplier, an intermediary rationally might ignore some evidence ex
ante, even though either the intermediary or an adversary to the intermediary would wish to argue about it after a claim is randomly selected. Alternatively, the judge might believe that intermediaries
would consider such evidence, but that such consideration would increase the cost of determining how much to bid on claims. Because
claimants ultimately bear this cost,106 a judge reasonably might decide
to ignore such evidence. Judges, however, should be careful not to exclude considerations that intermediaries could cheaply consider in informal ways. When a person “thinking fast” is likely to have an intuitive reaction to some detail, it probably bears some weight, even
though it would take a person a long time “thinking slow” to articulate
the detail’s relevance.107 We should not assume that the intuitive
106. See, e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (referencing the “bedrock principle known as the American Rule,” which provides that
“[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees”).
107. Cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–108 (2013) (comparing
two systems for making judgments).
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moralist or even intuitive economist in each of us is irrelevant; if intuitive reactions should be suppressed, it should be because they are
found irrelevant after careful consideration.
The exact nature of the evidence that judges would consider depends on the administrative program. The hypothetical Goodness and
Niceness Commission would naturally lend itself to specific information about just what an individual or entity applying for a part of
the subsidy did. Perhaps there is video or other contemporaneous evidence, or maybe witnesses exist. Expert evidence also might be important to assess how much the claimant actually helped people—for
example, by providing education or substance abuse services. Economists might testify about whether these individuals had better outcomes than others. But neither this nor any other agency need commit
solely to an economic methodology. Maybe ethicists or philosophers
would have relevant contributions. An advantage of adjudicating under a standard is that a wide range of considerations can be brought
to bear, even if they are generally viewed as incommensurable.108 Arguments might be made about the relative weight these considerations should have. If, over time, certain types of arguments, within or
across methodologies, come to be recognized as more reliable, intermediaries will change their expectations of how judges will rule. Random sampling thus makes it possible to integrate various methodologies in a way that would be difficult to accomplish with ex ante rules,
and in a way that allows expectations to evolve organically as
knowledge and information improves.
2. Measure of the Outcome
Once judges consider all of the evidence for a particular claim,
they must announce a claim valuation. With variable payouts, the
claim owner would simply receive the valuation amount, but with the
fixed fund approach recommended above, the claim valuation would
be divided by the sum of all claim valuations in the period to determine how much of the fund the claim owner should be paid.109 But
what happens if different judges disagree? Should we assign the claim
to a new panel, akin to the approach that the legal system takes if a

108. One might argue that where values are incommensurable, it is impossible to
weigh them against one another. See Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1287, 1313 (1998) (considering this claim). Standards are useful if multiple values should be weighed against
one another, even in the absence of a methodology for doing so objectively.
109. See supra Part I.A.1.
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jury is unable to agree on damages?110 Such a step is probably unnecessary, even if the agency decided to use juries as decisionmakers rather than judges.111 Instead, once judges have had a full opportunity
to consider all evidence and to deliberate amongst themselves, if there
is not full agreement, then either the average or median decision
might be determined to be the claim valuation.
But which value should be used—average or median? There is a
strong case for the median. Assume that claims are to be decided by
three-judge panels, with the judges randomly drawn from a broader
pool of judges. And suppose that a small percentage of judges have
wildly different views from other judges, for example by valuing some
claims at multiple orders of magnitude greater than other judges
would believe appropriate. A single outlier on a panel might then have
an outsized effect on an award if an average valuation metric were
used—and to the extent that intermediaries anticipate the possibility
of such a judge, such outlier judges have an outsize effect on the
amounts received by claimants. With a median measure, this effect
will be reduced, because two such judges with the same preferences
must be on the same panel to affect the final valuation.
The argument for using the median thus also suggests that threejudge panels are preferable to single-judge panels and may even provide an argument for still larger panels. The danger of outsized influence is even more disturbing if one imagines that perhaps some judges
will exaggerate their views to increase their influence. Other solutions
are possible. Techniques like peremptory strikes might be used to reduce the influence of outliers.112 Or perhaps, an average should be
used unless it deviates more than a certain percent from the median.
There is, however, a separate argument for using the median rather than the average. Suppose that there is disagreement not just
about the amount of the award but about whether someone should be
110. This is virtually unheard of, because juries will compromise on damages. Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 1007 (2003) (“[J]urors
[in civil cases] who have managed to agree on the yes or no question of whether a defendant has been proved responsible are very unlikely to be unable to reach a unanimous verdict on punishment.”).
111. Studies suggest that while different juries tend to compare different fact patterns similarly, they may be highly inconsistent when asked to award damages. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2075–81
(1998) (reporting results of jury experiments).
112. See Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 291, 291–92, 307 (2000) (discussing possibility of peremptory challenges
of judges and suggesting instead that appellate panels always include at least one
member of each major party).
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entitled to an award at all. For example, there might be a debate about
whether a claimant is eligible to receive awards. If the majority of
judges determines that a claimant is ineligible, there is a strong argument that the claimant should receive nothing. An analogy is to a tort
case in which the defendant is found not liable; we do not encourage
a jury to award one-quarter damages if they expect that one-quarter
of hypothetical juries would find liability.113
3. Effect of Precedent
Whether a median or average is used, judges would be encouraged to issue written opinions. By issuing a written opinion, a judge
shows the public that the judge has carefully considered the relevant
issues. A written opinion thus functions analogously to proof of
work114 and helps ensure that judges do not shirk their responsibilities to consider issues carefully. When reputational considerations
lead judges to care about their work product, intermediaries will
likely have greater confidence that relevant evidence will be considered. Intermediaries will thus be more likely to consider relevant evidence themselves in pricing claims. Equally important, an obligation
to explain one’s reasoning may decrease the probability that a judge
will rely on factors that the judge would not wish to admit relying on—
for example, because such consideration would violate a statute or the
Constitution.115 Written opinions also contribute to general
knowledge about the issue being adjudicated.116 If a judge has engaged in careful thought about some abstract issue, writing it down

113. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953) (“Courts uniformly disapprove
compromise verdicts but are without other means than admonitions to ascertain or
control the practice.”). For an explanation of how such compromise may adversely affect the legal system’s interests but suggesting that it may be appropriate in very close
cases, see Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 231, 246–50 (2001).
114. The concept of “proof of work” is most well known in the context of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NQ2-HQF4]. But others have drawn the analogy that many institutions may bestow status based on
demonstrated proof of work. See Eugene Wei, Status as a Service (StaaS), REMAINS DAY
(Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.eugenewei.com/blog/2019/2/19/status-as-a-service
[https://perma.cc/K72Y-N5N3].
115. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1338 (2008) (“[T]he act of writing puts the judge into greater
contact with the legal materials that are to govern her decision, thereby enhancing
their constraining effect.”).
116. See id. at 1327–29.
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may save a judge time in a later case, in much the same way a journal
article seeks to do the cognitive heavy lifting for others.
This justification of written opinions, however, is not the standard justification for precedent. Precedents are usually thought to be
valuable in part because they create at least provisionally binding
rules, constraining judges and reducing disparity.117 But when decisionmakers (here, the intermediaries) have strong incentives to act
like the average member of some other body (here, the ultimate
judges), disparity is less of a concern, and so precedent is less necessary. Even if decisionmakers are unpredictable and inconsistent, market pricing may be relatively consistent. Indeed, competition provides
strong incentives for market pricing consistency, because an intermediary that pays an unusually high amount for a claim loses money,
while one who offers too little will likely lose the claim to a competitor.
Intermediaries will develop models of how they expect decisionmakers to rule (perhaps based on surveys or focus groups of people with
backgrounds similar to the decisionmakers), updating these models
based on their observations of other intermediaries’ offers.118 Over
time, one should expect their models to converge, even without precedents, but also to evolve as relevant research emerges and attitudes
modernize.119 The public, meanwhile, will learn what claims are worth
based on how much intermediaries are willing to pay.
Precedents might even be a bad idea in this context. After all, they
undermine the virtues of standards over rules.120 Like any rule, a precedent will necessarily be overinclusive and underinclusive relative to
its purposes.121 The decisionmakers who issue precedents are just individuals, and they may have idiosyncratic beliefs about the relevant
issue. If a decisionmaker settles an issue, creating precedent, then future intermediaries will price claims according to that outcome rather
than their expectation of what a representative decisionmaker would
decide. On the other hand, the better the process for making
117. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187,
1232–34 (1994) (discussing constraining power of common law).
118. The rationale underlying this assertion is that intermediaries should recognize a phenomenon like the winner’s curse, where the winner of an auction may be the
party that has most overestimated the value of the auctioned asset. See, e.g., E.C. Capen,
R.V. Clapp & W.M. Campbell, Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, 23 J. PETROL.
TECH. 641, 641–53 (1971) (discussing the “winner’s curse”). The rational response to
losing auctions is to increase one’s bid in similar auctions, and the rational response to
winning is to lower one’s bid in the future. See id.
119. See id.
120. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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precedent, the less likely it will be that a particular precedent is just
one decisionmaker’s idiosyncratic belief. Multi-judge panels may create precedents, and the ordinary processes of common law decisionmaking allow precedents to adapt over time.122 Judges may be sensitive to the reduced need for precedents in the random selection regime, yet still decide that particular precedents have the potential to
be more transparent than market pricing. Thus, while precedent is not
essential when random selection is used, it still may perform a useful
role if used judiciously.
At the least, written opinions may be valuable for their persuasive value. Market pricing is opaque.123 Intermediaries have no incentives to release their rationales for concluding why they expect particular factors to affect claims’ expected values.124 In written opinions,
decisionmakers have the opportunity to apply established theory to
concrete facts—for example, developing reasons why some acts
should or should not be rewarded by our hypothetical Goodness and
Niceness Commission and how much credit various acts should receive. Should similar facts arise in a later case, those initial impressions may be useful in identifying some considerations relevant to the
problem. Over time, the set of relevant arguments and counterarguments would be further developed. The market will then assess—in
part based on its perception of the relative strength of these considerations, but also based on the views that judges seem to favor—the
probability that a judge will choose one position or another. In this
sense, market pricing can complement written opinions, assigning
weights to different perspectives even if decisions do not produce
conventional holdings. This approach reduces the risk associated with
idiosyncratic precedent, while still allowing legal ideas to flourish.
B. PARTICIPANTS
The parties that will study precedent most closely are the intermediaries, because, whether binding or not, opinions will provide insight into how decisionmakers think. We will consider whether the intermediaries should be regulated below, but in this Section, we
122. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) (arguing that inefficient rules are likely to be
litigated more, thus improving the efficiency of the common law); see also Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1179, 1179 (2007) (offering a balanced perspective on the debate concerning the common law’s efficiency).
123. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 396–97 (arguing that insurance policies are
not sufficiently transparent).
124. See id.
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consider how the random selection system should treat other involved individuals: judges, claimants, and perhaps those assigned the
role of arguing against the intermediaries.
1. Judges
Because intermediaries will set pricing based on who they expect
the judges to be, they may well focus on the identity and views of
judges. They might read a judge’s opinions and listen to a judge’s comments at public events just as the market listens to the Fed chair, not
for enlightenment about the underlying merits but for clues about individual predilections.125 If the pool of judges is large enough, this presents less of an issue, because intermediaries will not know who is
likely to resolve a particular claim. Nonetheless, intermediaries might
still focus on the characteristics of the judicial pool as a whole. Perhaps
of greatest concern, they might focus on whether most judges are from
one political party or another, especially if the question of how to distribute a fixed fund has a political valence. This focus further increases
instability, because prices could change dramatically after a presidential election.
One might view the tendency of prices to move with polls and
elections as beneficial, increasing judicial accountability. But one
could also view this as pernicious, the influence of politics on what
should be apolitical valuations. If so, then ideally the current administration ought not have much effect on the selection of judges. This
might not be possible, however, in the U.S. federal system, where principal officers must be nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.126 If the agency’s judges were inferior officers, perhaps
they could be appointed by “the courts alone,”127 thus attenuating political influence. But for that to be the case, the judges might not be
able to make final decisions,128 and giving the agency the ability to
overturn the judges would reintroduce political decision-making.

125. Academics already offer sophisticated analysis of judicial tendencies. See, e.g.,
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (analyzing Federal Circuit).
126. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a recent opinion finding certain agency
decisionmakers insulated from review to be principal officers, see Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith
& Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
127. See James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior Officers, and
the “Court of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1174–79 (2013) (proposing
approach for courts to use in appointing inferior officers).
128. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1328–29.
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Even in the U.S. federal system, however, there are alternatives
for reducing political influence. One approach would eliminate the
need for agency judges. Instead, valuations might be performed in federal court, by federal judges. The population of federal judges shifts
only slowly over time, because the judges have lifetime appointments.129 This would increase the workload of the federal courts, but
because of random selection, the increased burden on the courts
would be reasonable. If that is not feasible, an alternative approach
might be to appoint judges for relatively short periods of no more than
a few years, but postpone decision-making, perhaps by five or ten
years.130 The intermediaries then will be making their decisions not
based on what particular judges will do but based on what hypothetical future judges might do. Uncertainty about which political party
might win the presidency in the future would result in some weight
being assigned to each possibility, becoming just another factor in the
intermediaries’ model.
The possibility of resolving cases with federal judges highlights
that the judges could be generalists.131 There may, however, be value
to appointing judges with specialized expertise. A judge in a randomly
selected case ideally should be someone who can understand the various arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of how
much money, if any, an applicant to the fund should receive. The relevant expertise thus depends on the purpose of the subsidy that the
government is distributing. In some cases, an ideal judge might not
even be a lawyer. In existing regulatory regimes, administrative
judges almost always are lawyers because they must be able to understand how to deal with diverse legal materials, including statutes, case
law, and regulations, including both substantive and procedural
rules.132 If random selection were used to implement a standard
129. See Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 225
(2019).
130. Postponement of decisions may be counterproductive in our existing judicial
system, where it is important to resolve issues. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1380 (2011). But it should be more acceptable with a system,
like this one, that makes precedent less important. See supra Part II.A.3.
131. An argument for generalists in this context is that, with few cases to decide,
the advantage of specialist judges in processing cases matters less. See Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 854–70 (2012)
(arguing that although specialist courts may be more efficient, generalists may produce better decisions).
132. On the other hand, the fact that nonlawyers are allowed to represent disability applicants suggests that nonlawyers can be competent, if less effective on average
than lawyers. See, e.g., Survey Statistics: Can a Nonlawyer Advocate Help You Get Social
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without accompanying regulations, however, legal knowledge might
be less essential. The arguments for how much someone is entitled to
might sound more in economics or science, depending on the topic,
than in law. Returning to our hypothetical Commission, does anyone
believe that one must be a lawyer to take the measure of goodness and
niceness?
Lawyers do have an advantage in following procedural and evidentiary rules, but these might well be looser than in traditional adjudication, both because administrative law often uses informal adjudication133 and because procedural protections might be most
important when individual rights are at stake.134 The purpose of randomly selecting cases is not to preserve the rights of intermediaries,
but to discipline the decision-making of these intermediaries so their
bids to claimants reflect the statutory specification of the judicial valuation task. Procedural informality might introduce more variance in
decision-making, but a little bit of extra randomness ought not matter
when the goal is for claimants to estimate expected values. Secondorder questions such as whether particular arguments should be admissible may not improve decision-making on average even if they
may make decision-making more consistent. Moreover, judges are
likely to be influenced even by evidence that they find inadmissible,135
so allowing a broad scope of admissibility, as in arbitration,136 may
make sense. Some procedural rules might make sense (such as rules
restricting each litigant to a certain number of hours of presentation
time), but nonlawyers can follow such rules. Meanwhile, because intermediaries are applying for money rather than being dragged into

Security Disability Benefits?, NOLO, https://www.disabilitysecrets.com/resources/
survey-statistics-can-nonlawyer-advocate-help-get-social-security-disability-benefits
.html [https://perma.cc/AUY8-3XWX] (assessing success of applicants with nonlawyer representatives).
133. See Rubin, supra note 22, at 123–31 (discussing informal adjudication).
134. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 547 (2007) (explaining why due
process protections are greater for adjudication than for rulemaking).
135. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1286–1324 (2005) (reporting results of an experiment performed on judges
about the effect of inadmissible evidence).
136. See Paul Radvany, The Importance of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Arbitration, 36 REV. LITIG. 469, 470 (2016) (“Many arbitrators admit almost anything proffered as evidence, and these decisions are largely beyond review.”).
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court, standing, mootness, and other justiciability doctrines will not
have a large role.137
2. Claimants
When arguing a randomly selected case, an intermediary will
claim that the valuations corresponding to the original claimant
should be high. The claimant has nothing at stake. And yet, the claimant’s participation might be useful. The claimant presumably will have
already provided the intermediary with some supporting documentation, but, with the great stakes after a case is randomly selected for
adjudication, the intermediary will likely want to do more investigation of the facts, if such investigation is possible. This investigation
may require the cooperation of the claimant. How can such cooperation be achieved? The most straightforward approach would be for
the contract between the intermediary and the claimant to require cooperation. Similarly, insurance contracts require insureds to cooperate with insurance companies.138 The prospect that the insurance
company may enforce such a clause, by refusing to pay out on the insurance policy, is enough to induce cooperation from most claimants.
Yet one might worry that cooperation clauses will not be enough,
because claimants will have already received payment from the intermediary. This problem has at least two possible solutions. Either one
could be accomplished by voluntary contracting, though, because a
goal is to ensure equal treatment of claimants, it might be better to
create a general rule in the enacting legislation. The “stick” solution
would be for the intermediary to have the right to claw back funds
should a claimant not cooperate with the intermediary. A drawback of
the stick is that it may not work with judgment-proof claimants139 who
have already spent the money from the intermediary. Under the “carrot” solution, an intermediary might be allowed to give the claimant
some of the funds from the adjudication. For example, if one in one
thousand cases is adjudicated, the intermediary might give one-thousandth of the recovery—an amount that should on average be roughly

137. Cf. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–
78 (2000) (finding that statutory entitlement to money was sufficient for a whistleblower to establish standing).
138. See generally 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1427 (2020) (detailing interpretation
of cooperation clause).
139. See Amy Knapp, What Does Judgment Proof Mean?, NOLO, https://www.nolo
.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-does-judgment-proof-mean.html [https://perma.cc/
C5AQ-2SKY] (“[I]f you don’t have any income or property that the creditor can legally
go after, then . . . [the creditor] cannot collect on the judgment.”).
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equal to what the intermediary paid the claimant in the first place—
to the claimant.
3. Adversaries
With cooperation, the interests of intermediaries and claimants
should be roughly aligned. But who will have an incentive to point out
weaknesses in their arguments? One approach would be to leave this
to the judges. Inquisitorial development of the facts is the norm in Social Security adjudication,140 and it is widely used in Europe.141 A good
judge would look for weaknesses in the arguments of those seeking
funds and would dispassionately consider these weaknesses against
the strengths of the arguments. Even if we suspect that this will tilt
adjudication slightly in favor of claimants, that does not matter when
they are competing for a fixed fund. Unless there is an ex ante reason
that claimants would expect that one-sided presentation would favor
some claimants over others, judicial evaluation should not change expected values and thus the prices that intermediaries pay for claims.
It would also, however, be possible to designate “adversaries” in
each case, assigning each the goal of arguing against a claimant. These
might simply be employees of the administrative agency, charged with
conducting appropriate factual investigation and arguing against the
intermediary in a particular case in court. A more complex scheme
might provide financial incentives. Consider, for example, the following variation on final offer arbitration142: The intermediary is required
to announce the valuation that the intermediary seeks. The right to
oppose the intermediary might then be auctioned. The auction winner
would be the adversary and would announce a different valuation,
lower than the intermediary’s. The judge would be required to choose
between these values, rather than finding a compromise; this gives the
intermediaries an incentive not to exaggerate their asks.143 The entire
fund, plus auction revenues, would be distributed in proportion to the
amount requested by the intermediary, but if the adversary won, the
140. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000) (“Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts
and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits . . . .”).
141. But see David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634,
1668–88 (2009) (identifying reasons that American jurisprudence should not incorporate Continental inquisitorialism).
142. See, e.g., Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Bargaining with Informative Offers: An
Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 416 (1998) (“In [final-offer arbitration], the arbiter must choose one of the two submitted offers.”).
143. See id. at 428–29 (explaining how the mechanism encourages parties to be
reasonable in submitting valuations).
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intermediary would be required to pay it a portion of what it received,
specifically the difference between the valuations divided by the
amount requested by the intermediary.
Such an approach, though easily implemented, might be conceptually too complex for any early experimentation with market-based
random selection, but the virtues of both auctions and final offer arbitration seem apt in the random selection context. The use of auctions
borrows from an approach that was used in some class actions for the
right to become class counsel.144 The goal of such a procedure is to
align incentives between class members and counsel, but it is imperfect.145 Auctions may be more plausible here, where the winner of the
auction would not be representing a particular client. Meanwhile, final
offer arbitration limits the range of disagreement, because each party
has the incentive to make a reasonable offer. So long as the valuations
are announced before judges are chosen, this reduces the risk that an
idiosyncratic judge may have an outsized influence on the process. In
addition, it ensures that both the intermediary and the adversary have
the exact same amount of money at stake. They will thus tend to spend
similar amounts on the adjudication, ensuring genuinely adversarial
presentation.
Whether final offer auctions are used or not, settlements might
be allowed. In most adjudicative contexts, it goes without saying that
settlements should be encouraged.146 The case, however, is closer
with random selection. Because random selection already greatly reduces the number of cases to be adjudicated, the burden of adjudication will be much lower, and thus the adjudication costs saved relative
to the size of the program as a whole will be lower as well. If adjudication is viewed as providing a public good—for example, because
judges’ written opinions will enrich the public understanding about
what should count as advancing the government’s goals in the

144. See, e.g., In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1197–
1207 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (directing the appointment of the firm with the fee structure most
favorable to clients); Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 72 n.1 (2004) (citing similar cases);
Kathryn Kranhold & Richard B. Schmitt, To Rein In Fees, Some Judges Ask Attorneys To
Bid for Suits, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2000, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB976053221217460327 [https://perma.cc/8PBZ-MJBB].
145. See Harel & Stein, supra note 144, at 107–20 (explaining how to modify the
mechanism to improve incentive alignment).
146. See, e.g., Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94
YALE L.J. 1660 (1985) (arguing against the argument forwarded by Owen M. Fiss in
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)).
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administrative program147—then there may be an argument for forbidding settlement. The case against settlement is especially strong if
the adversaries are expected to be weak, for example because they do
not have as much at stake as the intermediaries. But if the final offer
auctions are used, this should not be a significant concern, and settlements would save some costs, ultimately increasing claimant payouts.
Moreover, final offer arbitration tends to promote settlement by revealing the parties’ information.148 Settlement could thus allow adjudication to become quite rare in such a system, perhaps further advancing the argument for resolving disputes with federal judges or
other generalists.149
III. REGULATION OF THE MARKET FOR CLAIMS
Whether or not settlement is permitted, the costs of adjudication
can be quite low if relatively few cases are selected for adjudication.
The market itself achieves the function of adjudication in most cases,
and the market will consume real resources. Intermediaries must invest in modeling decision-making and in evaluating individual claims,
but will also have incentives to make their claim evaluation processes
efficient, thus providing a foreseeable cost advantage over governmental adjudication of individual claims and discouraging idiosyncratic judgments. To be sure, these are as yet untested empirical
claims. At a minimum, the market provides incentives for consistent
claim resolution that are challenging to provide within an agency that
adjudicates every claim. The most powerful objection to the market
role is thus not that the market will be too expensive or random, but
that the market will systematically shortchange claimants, or at least
some groups of claimants.
The argument that the market will not shortchange claimants is
simple: competition. If intermediaries are making large profits, entrepreneurs will sense profit opportunities and enter the market, at least
assuming an absence of barriers to entry. Under standard models of
industrial organization, entry will dissipate supplier rents.150 The
147. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 238 (1979) (explaining that written opinions (i.e., precedent) may be a public good).
148. See Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 142 (modeling the effect of final-offer arbitration and noting that offers “may reveal private information”).
149. See supra Part II.B.1.
150. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 809–15 (1975) (offering a model of the social costs of monopoly with complete rent dissipation). See generally Paul Kleinsorge, Rent, BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/topic/rent-economics [https://perma.cc/B67L-3V25] (“In modern
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hope is that rents will be dissipated by competition to pay as much as
possible to claimants. Rents, however, could also be dissipated by expenditures on marketing, which is likely to be of low value in this context given the most probable deciding factor for most consumers is
who will pay them the most money.151 This should be less of a problem
than in the insurance context; consumers strongly consider prices in
buying insurance, so the usual concern is that consumers will pay insufficient attention to contractual protections.152 Here, all that matters
is price, so there should be no need for consumers to assess complex
contracts or guess which provider might offer the best service. Possibly a more serious concern is that political rent-seeking could occur,153 with claimants lobbying for the institution of licensing requirements, purportedly for consumer protection but in practice to reduce
competition.
Could a law creating an agency relying on random selection increase the competitiveness of intermediaries? This Part considers the
possible role of antitrust law, consumer protection law, and antidiscrimination law in ensuring that claimants receive a sufficient amount
from the fund.
A. ANTITRUST LAW
Individual claimants’ risk of unfairly low compensation due to
anti-competitive behavior would be reduced because ordinary antitrust law would presumably be in force. Thus, any attempts to engage
in price-fixing would be illegal and subject to treble damages.154 So too
would attempts by intermediaries to divide markets,155 either based
on geography or based on the identity of the claimants. Antitrust law,
economic usage, rent is represented as the difference between the total return to a
factor of production (land, labour, or capital) and its supply price—that is, the minimum amount necessary to attain its services.”).
151. Marketing may help promote economic efficiency for some products in countries with corruption or burdensome regulation. See M. Joseph Sirgy, Grace B. Yu, DongJin Lee, Shuqin Wei & Ming-Wei Huang, Does Marketing Activity Contribute to a Society’s
Well-Being? The Role of Economic Efficiency, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 91, 100 (2012) (“empirically demonstrat[ing] the positive predictive influence of marketing system on societal wellbeing”).
152. See Paul L. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 375, 404–05 (1973) (discussing consumers’ difficulty obtaining information about insurer quality).
153. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224, 231–32 (1967) (describing political rent-seeking).
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (allowing “threefold the damages”).
155. Such attempts also may be particularly amenable to class actions. See A.B.A.
SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS HANDBOOK 48–49 (2d ed. 2018).
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however, has its limits. A concern in modern antitrust scholarship is
that providers might tacitly collude,156 a prospect made more severe
by improvements in artificial intelligence.157 Moreover, antitrust law
does not penalize a company for being a monopoly, only for seeking to
monopolize.158 Thus, if it turns out that the function of intermediary is
a natural monopoly,159 antitrust law would offer little protection.160
Emergence of a natural monopoly seems unlikely, however. An intermediary need only develop a pricing model to enter the market, not
spend billions on a power plant.161
If the antitrust laws are insufficiently protective in the random
selection context, one could imagine specific solutions. A crude but
simple approach would be to limit any intermediary (or any set of
jointly owned intermediaries)162 from owning more than a set percentage of claims. If, for example, market share were limited to 20%
in a geographic region (perhaps defined at the county level) but an
intermediary bought up 30% of the claims, then each of its claims
would be penalized by being assigned a lower probability of random
selection, without a corresponding increase in the proportion of the
fund to which it would be entitled. This increases the incentive for another firm to enter the market. This approach is not without its limitations and downsides. Ideally it would be applied to nongeographical
markets (such as claims for particular types of claimants). Meanwhile,
156. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, M.J. Moltenbrey & Nathan Eimer, The Detection
and Punishment of Tacit Collusion, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 151, 156 (1997) (offering
hypothetical examples and explaining the problem they pose for antitrust enforcement).
157. See Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello,
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Rsch., Discussion Paper No. DP13405, 2019), https://a.qoid.us/SSRN-id3310310.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GU2B-8PH6].
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (outlawing “attempt to monopolize”).
159. Jim Chappelow, Natural Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia
.com/terms/n/natural_monopoly.asp [https://perma.cc/B5X9-AHY6] (Aug. 29, 2019)
(“A natural monopoly is a type of monopoly that exists due to the high start-up costs
or powerful economies of scale of conducting a business in a specific industry.”).
160. Natural monopoly status is not a defense, but the plaintiff must still demonstrate exclusionary conduct. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 325–26 (2003).
161. See Chappelow, supra note 159.
162. Recent antitrust scholarship has focused increasingly on the danger that
cross-ownership can encourage collusion, even in public companies. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1278–1301 (2016); Eric A.
Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal To Limit the Anticompetitive
Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 680–91 (2016) (detailing the potential harms of common ownership).
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excessively strict market share limits may reduce achievement of
economies of scale. But because the service provided by intermediaries is homogenous, market share limits seem more plausible here than
in markets for which incentives are essential to foster innovation.
An alternative approach to ensure that most of a fund goes to
claimants would be for a statute to limit the profit of the industry as a
whole based on the industry’s costs. The website transferring claims
could collect information about the sales price for these claims. Intermediaries might be required to submit information indicating their total expenses in researching claims and in adjudicating randomly selected cases. By statute, total industry profits would be capped at some
percentage above this level. Any excess might be distributed to all
claimants in proportion to the amounts they initially received. Profits
would not apply on a per-firm basis because some firms might be particularly skilled and thus deserve greater payments and also because
random selection would complicate the assessment. If markets are
sufficiently competitive, this regulation may be unnecessary and,
given the need to audit industry-reported expenses and to ensure that
claim sales are in arms-length transactions, cumbersome. But it does
provide a relatively straightforward way of ensuring that the vast bulk
of any fund goes to claimants.
B. CONSUMER LAW
Consumer protection law also might be tailored to the random
selection context, but the degree of supervision required is likely
much less than in other important contexts. The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) might be seen as saving consumers from
bad terms buried in small print163 or perhaps from attractive financial
products that they cannot actually afford.164 Because consumers are
selling their claims, they should care only about how much money
they receive. There might, however, be a role for government in defining a single standard contract for such transactions, or for mandating
warnings for nonstandard contracts. For example, intermediaries
might be required to give consumers disclosures encouraging the consumers to contact other intermediaries to obtain the best possible
price.

163. The CFPB’s website formerly promised that the agency would ensure “that
nothing is buried in fine print.” About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau [https://perma.cc/Y5FG-D627].
164. See id. (emphasizing mission to ensure “that prices are clear up front [and]
that risks are visible”).
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Even better, intermediaries might be required to give claimants
time to shop around for offers. An intermediary might adopt the old
used car salesman tactic of offering a great deal available only that
day. Such high-pressure sales pitches not only are inherently unpleasant but also may victimize relatively low-information consumers. But
there are simple solutions, such as laws authorizing cooling-off periods, permitting consumers to cancel transactions within some period
of time, such as a month.165 The Internet should make it easy for consumers to shop around for better offers. A drawback of this approach
is that it might allow second-movers to free-ride166 off the valuations
of other intermediaries. If Intermediary A has a reputation for performing detailed research, Intermediary B might adopt a policy of paying any consumer a bit more than A offered. This may discourage A
from performing careful investigation.
Potential compromises exist, however. An intermediary, for example, might be allowed to insist that a consumer walking away from
a previously accepted offer pay to the intermediary some percentage
(perhaps 2%, or some other number designated by statute). Indeed,
the statute might provide that intermediaries must publish tentatively
accepted offers, along with some basic, nonidentifying information
about the claimant and an anonymized email address at which the
claimant could be reached. If an intermediary developed a reputation
for paying too little (by more than the specified statutory percentage),
third parties would have an incentive to submit higher bids on these
claims. They might do so sight unseen if the offering intermediary’s
reputation were sufficiently bad, or they might simply encourage
claimants to consider selling to them instead. Thus, a relatively easyto-implement consumer protection rule could help trigger an auction
for claimants’ rights, while still ensuring some compensation for intermediaries performing initial investigations.
C. ANTI-FRAUD LAW
So long as claimants seek the highest price from intermediaries,
it is unlikely that intermediaries will have occasion to engage in fraud,
165. See generally Jeff Sovern, Written Notice of Cooling-Off Periods: A Forty-Year
Natural Experiment in Illusory Consumer Protection and the Relative Effectiveness of
Oral and Written Disclosures, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 333, 334 & nn.1–5 (2014) (discussing
such laws).
166. See generally Jim Chappelow, Free Rider Problem, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/f/free_rider_problem.asp [https://perma.cc/HLH3-5TEE]
(July 25, 2019) (“The free rider problem is the burden on a shared resource that is
created by its use or overuse by people who aren’t paying their fair share for it or aren’t
paying anything at all.”).
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though any fraud by intermediaries (for example, false statements
that claimants are not permitted to talk to other intermediaries) could
be prosecuted. The greater fraud danger to a claimant is fraud by other
claimants. With a fixed fund, honest claimants are victimized by the
dishonesty of other claimants. For example, if half of the fund goes to
entirely bogus claims, then each honest claimant receives only half the
award the claimant would have received in fraud’s absence. Fraud
could be policed as in any other market. If an intermediary believed
that a claimant was attempting to defraud it or had successfully done
so, the intermediary could report this to federal prosecutors who then
could decide how to proceed. The government thus must decide, as
with any other administrative regime, the optimal amount to spend
on fraud investigations, prosecutions, and, where appropriate, punishment.
Yet perhaps the most important protection against fraud is the
incentive of intermediaries to be vigilant. If an intermediary believes
that some evidence submitted is fraudulent, the intermediary will
have an incentive to offer less, dig deeper, or walk away. In a rulebound government agency, suspicions of fraud can be addressed only
through cumbersome procedures, so if a single medical expert gives
many dubious diagnoses, the agency may need to treat these as legitimate unless it wishes to undertake an expensive investigation.167 Intermediaries, by contrast, will have an incentive to make informal assessments of the credibility of witnesses, including experts, gauging
the outcome of a hypothetical detailed adjudication. Sometimes, an
honest claimant might be disbelieved, but the market at least also provides incentives for intermediaries to bid up the value of strong claims
from which others have shied.
D. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
The argument that competition will drive up prices is perhaps
reminiscent of Gary Becker’s explanation of how discrimination creates profit opportunities that in turn can counter discrimination.168
167. A drawback of rare highly publicized enforcement is that the public may erroneously conclude that fraud is common. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 882–84 (1998)
(noting that concerns about claims fraud disproportionately emphasize claimant-side
fraud despite contrary data about the prevalence of employer fraud).
168. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (1957) (explaining
how a “taste for discrimination” measures the monetary value discriminators “pay” to
discriminate). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 22, 31–34 (1991) (providing additional, nonstandard arguments as to
why markets fail to stop discrimination).
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Indeed, if minority or women claimants were paid less than white
male claimants for equally valuable claims, then intermediaries will
have incentives to bid up these claims. Full acceptance of this logic,
however, would suggest that some areas of antidiscrimination law,
such as protections against “redlining,” are unnecessary.169 Such protections continue to exist, however,170 and they could be applied to
transactions between intermediaries and consumers. The statute creating the random selection markets might require intermediaries to
report aggregate claim values for racial or other subgroups, including
geographical subgroups, to facilitate the filing of such claims.
One reason that intermediaries might be motivated to discriminate would be if they expect that the ultimate adjudication itself is
likely to discriminate. So long as witness credibility is at issue, judges
might discriminate,171 and reliance on standards rather than rules
may increase the danger.172 Discrimination is especially likely, however, when decisionmakers make many decisions with relatively little
scrutiny. The large stakes of randomly selected claims will highlight
issues of expert evidence, possibly reducing the focus on the characteristics of the claimant and thus the likelihood that conscious or subconscious bias will affect assessments. But for discrimination that persists, the law can provide remedies. Antidiscrimination law generally
bans statistical discrimination,173 including discrimination that is economically rational based on the aggregate characteristics of some
group, as well as discrimination that is rational based on third parties’
anticipated discrimination.174 The statute regulating intermediaries
could explicitly allow suits based on these theories and clarify that
169. For an analysis highlighting methodological difficulties in determining
whether race discrimination exists in the mortgage market, see Andrew Holmes & Paul
Horvitz, Mortgage Redlining: Race, Risk, and Demand, 49 J. FIN. 81 (1994).
170. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o refuse to sell or rent . . .
a dwelling to any person because of race . . . .”).
171. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 266–317 (1996) (discussing the effects of discrimination
on credibility assessments).
172. See Samuel Estreicher, Achieving Antidiscrimination Objectives Through “Safe
Harbor” Rules for Cases of Chronic Hiring Aversion, U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 1, 3–5 (2017)
(examining the potential costs of relying on rules rather than standards to prevent discrimination).
173. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A
Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 790–91 (1995) (noting that statistical
discrimination is illegal under disparate treatment theory).
174. The classic example of this is customer discrimination. See, e.g., Jonathan S.
Leonard, David I. Levine & Laura Giuliano, Customer Discrimination, 92 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 670, 671–73 (2010) (modeling the effects of customer discrimination).
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they encompass situations in which the market anticipates judicial
bias.
IV. APPLICATIONS TO CLIMATE CHANGE, PANDEMICS,
AND OTHER EMERGENCIES
Parts I through III have used the example of a generic administrative agency to demonstrate how randomly selecting a small number
of cases for adjudication can provide market incentives for pricing
claims based on a vague standard. The case for the market-based approach is strongest when an administrative problem is so vast that a
conventional agency could not easily address it.175 To consider some
specific applications of the market-based approach, we focus on one
of the greatest problems of our time: climate change. A vast literature
exists assessing the danger of climate change176 and various legal responses to it.177 This Article’s goal is to show how random selection
markets might prevent climate change or, failing that, perform better
in distributing funds than the government has in other disasters, including the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
This Article simply assumes that a legislature or other arm of a
government wishes to spend money either to combat climate change
or to compensate the victims of climate change or some other disaster.
The point is not to argue that the particular expenditures represent
the best way of fighting climate change, either in the United States or
in an international treaty. Rather, it is to highlight that distributing
funds connected to climate change on an economy-wide basis is a
massive administrative challenge178—and it is a challenge that may be
much more easily met with random selection and sales to intermediaries than with a traditional administrative structure. Some of the proposals are novel, even though they would be obvious policy candidates if we conclude that an administrative agency could efficiently
administer a broad standard governing how to distribute funds. That
175. See supra Introduction.
176. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change creates periodic reports synthesizing the latest research. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT (Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri &
Leo Meyer eds., 2014).
177. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENV’T L. 363, 372 (2010) (“To be sure, legal scholarship on climate change policy is sharply on the rise.”).
178. See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
59 (2010) (broadly discussing administrative challenges with handling climate
change).
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these proposals have not been suggested before highlights how much
governmental ambition is constrained by a shared assumption that efficiently scaling standards is impossible.
The diversity of these proposals also establishes that marketbased random selection can be used in diverse contexts, whether or
not the contexts have anything to do with climate change: when each
claimant might be entitled to large payments and also when there are
many claimants entitled to small payments, when rules might be feasible and when they are almost surely infeasible. Section A describes
various funds that the government might distribute as part of anti-climate change efforts. The proposals include compensating people hurt
by legislation to combat climate change, reimbursing expenditures for
improving building efficiency, and promoting research and development. Section B explains how funds to compensate for climate change
or other disasters that occur. A fund subsidized by the government
might be used to share the burden of climate change while limiting the
role of politics in measuring loss.
A. PREVENTING CLIMATE CHANGE
This Section considers the possibility of three possible compensation funds designed to prevent climate change. Subsection 1 elaborates on the fund described in the Introduction to compensate those
harmed by anti-climate change legislation, and Subsection 2 assesses
how a fund might be used to compensate building owners who improve energy efficiency. Then, Subsection 3 assesses whether funds
might be used to reward research and development into new technologies.
1. Compensation for Legislative Losers
Many economists have long argued that the best approach to addressing climate change is to impose a carbon tax179 or to create a capand-trade system for greenhouse emissions.180 These proposals, however, have had only modest political successes.181 In France, for
179. See, e.g., Frederick van der Ploeg & Cees Withagen, Growth, Renewables, and
the Optimal Carbon Tax, 55 INT’L ECON. REV. 283, 283 (2014) (“A substantial and possibly rising carbon tax is needed . . . .”).
180. See, e.g., MATT HORN, CAP AND TRADE: REDUCING POLLUTION, INSPIRING INNOVATION 11 (2008). For a comparison of these two approaches, see Lawrence H. Goulder &
Andrew R. Schein, Carbon Taxes Versus Cap and Trade: A Critical Review, 4 CLIMATE
CHANGE ECON. 1, 2–25 (2013).
181. Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, The Flawed Logic of the Cap-andTrade Debate, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 19, 2009), https://e360.yale.edu/features/the_
flawed_logic_of_the_cap-and-trade_debate [https://perma.cc/82DR-9DHR] (arguing

1392

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1345

example, a recent proposal to institute a carbon tax was withdrawn
after mass protests.182 Part of the problem, no surprise, is that the
public does not like tax increases.183 Thus, some have proposed that
carbon taxes be redistributed to the U.S. population as a whole as “carbon dividends,”184 following Canada, which has implemented such an
approach.185 The hope is that a broad political constituency will
emerge in support of policies combatting climate change once people
start receiving checks.186 Others have argued that commitments to
earmark carbon tax revenue for environmental programs might increase voter support.187 Either approach, however, may not be easy to
enact, because while many people would see sufficiently small tax increases that they might judge worth the benefits, a smaller group will
be especially harmed,188 and small groups may be able to lobby efficiently.189

that current efforts to tax or cap carbon emissions are “doomed to failure”).
182. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin & Somini Sengupta, ‘Yellow Vest’ Protests Shake France.
Here’s the Lesson for Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/12/06/world/europe/france-fuel-carbon-tax.html [https://perma.cc/
83TB-L8YF].
183. But see Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Lucy Martin & Kenneth Scheve, The Structure
of American Income Tax Policy, 79 J. POL. 1 (2016) (discussing how degree of dislike of
paying taxes varies based on income bracket).
184. See, e.g., JAMES A. BAKER, III, MARTIN FELDSTEIN, TED HALSTEAD, N. GREGORY
MANKIW, HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., GEORGE P. SCHULTZ, THOMAS STEPHENSON & ROB WALTON,
CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017),
https://www.clcouncil.org/media/2017/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-Carbon
-Dividends.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V9C-NTCA].
185. See Canada Adopts Carbon Fee and Dividend To Rein In Climate Change, CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY (Oct. 23, 2018), https://citizensclimatelobby.org/canada-adopts
-carbon-fee-and-dividend-to-rein-in-climate-change [https://perma.cc/8M7M
-2WKR].
186. See Kate Yoder, Republicans Are Backing a ‘Carbon Dividend.’ What the Heck Is
That?, GRIST (June 21, 2018), https://grist.org/article/republicans-are-backing-a
-carbon-dividend-what-the-heck-is-that [https://perma.cc/463K-GETY].
187. See DAVID AMDUR, BARRY G. RABE & CHRISTOPHER BORICK, PUBLIC VIEWS ON A CARBON TAX DEPEND ON THE PROPOSED USE OF REVENUE 4 (Issues in Energy & Env’t Pol’y, No.
13, 2014), http://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup.umich.edu/files/ieep-nsee-2014
-spring-carbon-tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB5W-Q5KS]; Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2017) (“[E]vidence from focus
groups indicates that many people ignore the incentive effects of environmental taxes
and conclude that they will be ineffective unless the government uses the resulting
revenue to fund environmental programs.”).
188. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53 (1965) (“The greater
the effectiveness of relatively small groups . . . is evident from observation and experience as well as from theory.”).
189. Id. at 141 (describing the effectiveness of small “special interest” groups).
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A different strategy would be to redistribute carbon tax revenue
directly to those most likely to suffer from the legislation combatting
climate change.190 Whether such a plan would be more politically palatable is beyond my scope here. Also beyond my scope is whether
there would be adverse consequences from paying off those harmed
by anti-climate-change legislation in this manner. One might argue, for
example, that anticipation of compensation will create incentives to
use large amounts of carbon in hope of compensation.191 Or, alternatively, one might argue that if the goal is simply to maximize the political enactability of the legislation, the compensation should be directed not necessarily at those who suffer from the legislation, but
instead at those most likely to be median voters.192 Perhaps West Virginia should not receive compensation at all, because it is unlikely to
be converted to the environmental cause anyway.193
This Article’s project is to assume that the goal is to distribute
money (perhaps carbon tax revenue) to those adversely affected in
proportion to how they are affected. The argument for random selection is based largely on the infeasibility of administrative alternatives.
As argued in the Introduction,194 bright-line rules determining eligibility will be virtually impossible to devise unless limited to the most
obvious cases, such as coal miners. Even then, the actual measure of
damages may be crude, failing to take into account nuances such as
whether those who have lost jobs are in a position to transition easily
to other employment, based on considerations such as their educational background and whether their family ties make it feasible to
move to other cities. Calculation becomes far more complex for indirectly affected individuals. It is often said that a single job supports

190. Some argue for offsetting the overall distributional effect of a carbon tax, for
example by simultaneously making the income tax more progressive. Metcalf &
Weisbach, supra note 6, at 513–16.
191. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
527–29 (1986) (making the broader point that parties may behave more efficiently if
they anticipate retroactive tax legislation enacting an efficient rule).
192. Anthony McGann, Voting Choice and Rational Choice, OXFORD RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA POL. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/
9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-79 [https://perma.cc/75MK
-AHSX] (“[I]t is optimal for both parties to position themselves at the preference of the
median voter [to enact policies].”).
193. America’s Greenest States, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2007), https://www.forbes.com/
2007/10/16/environment-energy-vermont-biz-beltway-cx_bw_mm_1017
greenstates.html#787bd366119d [https://perma.cc/PZG5-WDKW] (ranking West
Virginia as America’s least “green” state).
194. See supra Introduction.
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multiple other jobs.195 But every town is different, as is every job and
every worker and family. It would be extraordinarily difficult to devise
reasonable payment formulas ex ante. If formulas left any ambiguity
(and likely even if they did not), the administrative burden of processing tens or hundreds of millions of claims would be enormous.
Achieving reform within a conventional administrative structure
would thus be difficult. Suppose, for example, that an agency included
a single tier of decisionmakers. The resources required to staff the
agency with enough decisionmakers initially would be large, and it
would be difficult to craft incentives that would prevent idiosyncratic
decision-making.
A different approach, but one that would also require a massive
investment in personnel, might be to establish an agency with great
discretion, vested ultimately in the agency head, to distribute money.
The agency’s decisions might not even be conceived as adjudications.196 Such a model bears resemblance to the approach used in the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,197 whose head, Kenneth
Feinberg, generally received praise for distributing funds fairly.198 But
the Victim Compensation Fund involved a relatively small number of
claimants,199 and the limited duration of the Fund200 and relative lack
of political disagreement about the relevant considerations in distributing money made the identity of the head of the Fund less important.201 Due process was also less of a concern, because anyone
could decline an offer of compensation and bring an individual lawsuit.202 The climate change issue, including the question of who deserves the greatest payments, is sufficiently politically charged that
payments in a highly hierarchical model might depend greatly on the
195. See, e.g., Gregory Schmid, Manufacturing: The Key to Future Jobs, CHALLENGE,
Nov./Dec. 1988, at 54, 56.
196. Matthew Lee Wiener, General Rules for Agency Adjudications?, REGUL. REV.
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/10/29/wiener-general-rules
-agency-adjudications [https://perma.cc/L6BS-QEAC] (broadly discussing the lack of
uniformity for adjudications across agencies).
197. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 28 C.F.R. pt. 104(c) (2019).
198. For Feinberg’s own account, see Kenneth R. Feinberg, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 32 LITIG. 14, 14–17 (2006).
199. Id. at 14 (reporting more than 5,000 families and physical injury survivors
participating in program).
200. Id. (noting that Feinberg only administered the Fund for thirty-two months).
201. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Speech: Negotiating the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Mass Tort Resolution Without Litigation, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21,
29 (2005) (“I had tremendous support . . . and it was bipartisan.”).
202. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–42,
§ 405(a)(1).
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identity of the agency head.203 At least that is likely to be so if the
agency head controls the salary and continued employment of subordinates. If not, the agency would be a behemoth with great discretion
vested in lower-level employees, resulting in disparity. Uniform substantive and procedural rules might reduce disparity, but only somewhat and only at high cost.204
Using a random selection market would reduce the government’s
administrative burden. This approach relies on a dynamic market sector to price individual claims.205 Ultimately, the effectiveness of claim
pricing is an empirical question. Yet it is not even clear how one could
design a study to measure pricing accuracy, as an adjudication that
reaches a very different result from the claim price could be a result
of an idiosyncratic decisionmaker. If the government were to implement the random selection market, the public would assess the accuracy of claim pricing informally, likely placing excess weight on highly
salient cases.206 This public assessment might determine the random
selection approach’s destiny. A virtue of the random selection market
is that the government can scale it easily over time, simply by changing the size of the fund. For example, the government might pass modest climate change legislation with a modest fund, and if that proves
sufficiently popular, it could then pass more encompassing legislation
with a larger fund.
2. Green Upgrades Expense Compensation
Compensation for adverse effects of legislation is especially challenging, because the circumstances of those who might apply for compensation are so diverse. This strengthens the case for random selection, because this diversity might make rules difficult to enact. But
203. David B. Spence, The Effects of Partisan Polarization on the Bureaucracy, in CAN
AMERICA GOVERN ITSELF? 272–73 (Frances E. Lee & Nolan McCarty eds., 2019) (discussing the strain that political polarizations places on agencies and its impact on agency
decision-making).
204. Robert R. Kuehn, Bias in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 45 ENV’T L.
957, 1009 (2015) (studying the prevalence of discrepancy in environmental agency
decision-making despite rules to eliminate bias).
205. See supra Part III.
206. Individuals often make judgments based on examples that come most easily
to mind. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (discussing the availability heuristic). With the random selection market, judgments might be affected by cases that receive high publicity. For example, the public might wrongly infer that a claimant received too little when an idiosyncratic decisionmaker made a very high evaluation ex
post.
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random selection markets also might be used for less open-ended
measurement challenges. Consider, for example, the problem of upgrading the energy efficiency of existing buildings.207 A recent proposal in the United States known as the “Green New Deal” recommends, among other things, upgrading the energy efficiency of every
building in the country.208 Yet the government will inevitably face
trade-offs in what upgrades it might reimburse. For example, one
might not be allowed a free trade-in of a television to the newest LED
television display, even if it is the most energy efficient model.209
Let us assume that government subsidization of energy efficiency
upgrades of existing buildings is desirable, but that it also makes sense
for the government to allocate its limited resources to the upgrades
that make the most difference. With random selection markets, the
United States might establish a fixed fund to distribute among building
owners who provide evidence of improving energy efficiency, such as
receipts and proof that old inefficient equipment has been destroyed.
This approach, like the legislation compensation fund, can easily be
tested on a small scale and then scaled if successful. Even though the
model developed here is intended to allow for massive governmental
programs, smaller experiments can test its viability. For example, the
government initially might provide a fund of only a few billion dollars
for energy upgrades paid for in a particular year, and then if that
proves successful, it might increase the size of the fund to hundreds of
billions of dollars, without necessarily increasing the size of the
agency adjudicating claims. As the program scales, each claim is less
likely to be randomly selected, and randomly selected claims earn
more, but the adjudicative task stays essentially the same. The government could change the mission of the program if appropriate, for

207. Jon Creyts, Hannah Choi Granade & Kenneth J. Ostrowski, US Energy Savings:
Opportunities and Challenges, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 1, 2010), https://www.mckinsey
.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/us-energy-savings-opportunities-and-challenges# [https://perma.cc/89HG-477M] (“Upgrading building
shells and heating and cooling equipment, mostly in existing homes, represents the
largest opportunity” for residential sector energy savings.”).
208. See Salvador Rizzo, What’s Actually in the ‘Green New Deal’ from Democrats?,
WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/
11/whats-actually-green-new-deal-democrats [https://perma.cc/S7QF-H73C] (recommending “[u]pgrading all existing buildings in the United States and building new
buildings to achieve maximal energy efficiency, water efficiency, safety, affordability,
comfort, and durability, including through electrification”).
209. See Most Energy Efficient TV 2019 | Types | Reviews, ALT. ENERGY, https://
powersolarphoenix.com/most-energy-efficient-tv-types [https://perma.cc/T85U
-GBR2] (rating LED TVs as most energy efficient).
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example by giving greater incentives for technologies with the potential to improve efficiency even more over time.210
A building upgrades program could use a more traditional agency
structure, but not without difficulty. The agency might approach its
regulatory task by rating the energy efficiency of many different products, such as cars, appliances, and building materials.211 Then, the
agency might devise a formula for determining total energy savings
based on the item being replaced and the replacement. Ideally, such a
scheme also would factor in energy usage data, since it makes little
sense to subsidize replacement of, say, a gas guzzler that was barely
driven even before the statute was passed. Taxpayers might then be
able to take tax credits on their income tax returns. In addition to being informationally demanding, however, this system might easily be
gamed. A taxpayer might claim nonexistent upgrades. Thus, the
agency might need to create a nationwide corps of building inspectors,
who ideally would come both before and after upgrades.212 Or, it
might give states incentives to perform inspections, with penalties on
states that do a poor job. Such incentives, however, might be challenging to administer and calibrate.
The random selection approach’s primary advantage over a traditional agency is not in saving the expense of devising ex ante rules,
but in processing an enormous number of relatively small claims.213
Creating an efficient bureaucracy for assessing the validity of billions
of claims would not be easy, especially if the process involves inherent
subjectivity. The random selection program gives incentives for intermediaries to find low-cost ways to verify the accuracy of claimed
210. Advocates of clean energy subsidies argue that early innovations provide a
foundation for later innovations. See Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation
Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 389 (2017). Some technologies,
however, might have greater potential than others for such snowballing. Id. at 392 (discussing the dynamics of innovation that impact snowballing by hypothesizing an application to solar technology). For example, if a fusion reactor were created at great
cost, it might deserve greater subsidy than wind, where further improvements will run
up against the Betz limit. See generally Betz Limit, ENERGY EDUC., https://
energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Betz_limit [https://perma.cc/JDE5-V9DS] (defining Betz limit as the “theoretical maximum efficiency for a wind turbine”).
211. Such testing is not always trivial, as evidenced by a scandal involving
Volkswagen’s manipulation of energy efficiency tests. See Jack Ewing, Inside VW’s Campaign of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/
business/inside-vws-campaign-of-trickery.html [https://perma.cc/FGD2-8WLJ].
212. See generally Peter J. May & Robert S. Wood, At the Regulatory Front Lines:
Inspectors’ Enforcement Styles and Regulatory Compliance, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. &
THEORY 117 (2003) (discussing the role that building inspectors can have in regulatory
compliance).
213. See supra Part I.B.1.
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improvements. For example, intermediaries might devise AI systems
to assess before-and-after photos and receipts, if that is technologically feasible. Just as taxpayers have incentives to find ways to cheat
the IRS, so too would building owners have incentives to find ways to
cheat intermediaries. But intermediaries may be more adaptable, unconstrained by the notice-and-comment process,214 and will want to
ensure that they are not paying for claims that will be judged worthless when eventually adjudicated and scrutinized.
3. Innovation Rewards
Part of the goal of spending a fund on energy efficiency upgrades
might be to encourage research on energy efficiency technologies or
other technologies to combat or adapt to climate change.215 Yet it
would also be possible for a fund to be used directly to reward successful research and development. For example, the government
might establish a fund to be distributed to researchers in proportion
to their contribution to combatting climate change. Because it will be
difficult to know the usefulness of such research for years,216 the government might delay paying out the fund, for example by investing the
money to be distributed for research each year in the stock market for
fifty years. The example illustrates that intermediaries need not be
paid right away; so long as they will eventually be paid with interest,
they will have incentives to buy up claims. Intermediaries can seek
further funding from capital markets, either by selling equity or by
seeking out loans. Capital market funders of intermediaries would
have their own incentives to assess the intermediaries’ portfolios,
whether by themselves sampling purchased claims or by scrutinizing
the intermediaries’ models and methods.
A justification for the government to subsidize research and development is that the patent system is not an effective tool for combatting climate change.217 The limited duration of patents makes it
214. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
215. Mary Beth Gallagher, The Race to Develop Renewable Energy Technologies,
MIT NEWS (Dec. 18, 2019), https://news.mit.edu/2019/race-develop-renewable
-energy-technologies-1218 [https://perma.cc/7T5T-SK2E] (identifying the need for
energy technologies and specific growing fields).
216. Climate change research has been going on since 1640, and often it takes
many years to complete and understand such research. See History of Climate Science
Research, UCAR CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC., https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/how-climate
-works/history-climate-science-research [https://perma.cc/ZZM8-A2ZA].
217. Ofur Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate Change: A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENV’T L. 211,
231 (2018) (explaining challenges of patent appropriability in context of climate
change, stating “the patent system is far from an optimal incentive mechanism in the
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hard for those who contribute to addressing a long-term problem to
appropriate value from their work.218 It is unlikely that a single inventor could solve climate change, but an inventor who did so likely
would not make much money, as governments could simply wait until
the patent expired to deploy the solution.219 If, as seems more likely,
multiple generations of research are needed to address the problem
completely,220 the work of early research may be useful but not commercially viable within the patent term. This problem is not unique to
climate change. Much early-stage research receives inadequate incentives from patents.221 But the problem is likely especially acute in this
context, because the costs of climate change are expected to rise dramatically in the future.222
When the social value of inventions diverges greatly from appropriable private benefits, patent theorists suggest that alternatives to
the patent system may be appropriate.223 Literature has considered
the possibility of prize or reward alternatives to the patent system,224
recognizing that government can reduce deadweight loss by compensating inventors and placing their inventions in the public domain.225
Some scholars have argued that the government should buy out

environmental field, and thus cannot be trusted to adequately promote the development of climate change technologies”).
218. Id. (noting that “[p]atents have limited scope and duration, and some downstream uses may fall outside the patent’s scope or be performed long after it expires”).
219. See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward New Form of Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1404 (2011) (“The time between the present
and when global warming is expected to cause major problems is likely greater than
the length of the patent term, so patent incentives to reverse global warming may be
absent.”).
220. Tur-Sinai, supra note 217, at 212 & n.1 (“[Climate change] will be a part of the
future for our generation and for many to follow.” (quoting J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975, 977–78 (2013))).
221. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 180 (1987) (exploring challenges of
promoting basic research with patents).
222. MARCY LOWE & REBECCA MARX, DATU RSCH., CLIMATE CHANGE-FUELED WEATHER
DISASTERS: COSTS TO STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIES 4 (2020) (documenting the economic
loss trends due to climate change-fueled natural disasters).
223. See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the
Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1909–10 (2013).
224. Id. at 1909.
225. See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes To Stimulate R&D for
New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1520 (2007); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual
Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1025 (2014); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 525, 530 (2001).
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patents based on their private value,226 but this method will be inefficient when that private value is a poor measure of social value.227 An
alternative approach with a rich historical lineage228 is for the government to create prizes, with an entire prize given to the first party that
meets some goal.229 But it is unlikely that a single person or entity will
solve the climate change problem.
A more appropriate solution in the literature is the possibility of
rewards, in which each inventor receives value proportionate to their
contributions.230 An argument against such proposals is that government valuation may be unpredictable.231 Invention is inherently risky,
however, and because all that matters is that inventors receive the expected value of the contributions, it does not matter if the government
might pay too much or too little in a particular case.232 Just as intermediaries with random selection ensure that claimants can receive
appropriate compensation even with uncertain valuations, so too can
capital markets ensure adequate payment to inventors in a reward
system.
Yet a significant administrative problem remains unaddressed in
the literature: Is it feasible for the government to adjudicate every
claim for reward? Decisionmaker variance may be tolerable in this
context, but it remains critical that adjudications be careful, lest the
rewards and thus the market prioritize superficial achievements over
real accomplishments. This concern may explain why one project that
advocated for international implementation of a reward program focused narrowly on one type of innovation: pharmaceuticals.233

226. See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1138 (1998).
227. UN TASK TEAM ON SOC. DIMENSIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (Discussion Draft 2011) (discussing the need to include social values
when evaluating climate change).
228. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Law and Longitude, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2009)
(discussing the history of the longitude prize).
229. See Fiona Murray, Scott Stern, Georgina Campbell & Alan MacCormack, Grand
Innovation Prizes: A Theoretical, Normative, and Empirical Evaluation, 41 RSCH. POL’Y
1779 (2012).
230. See Michael Abramowicz, Prize and Reward Alternatives to Intellectual Property, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 350
(Ben Depoorter & Peter S. Menell eds., 2019) (distinguishing prize and reward approaches).
231. Id. at 360.
232. Id.
233. See AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 3 (2008), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The
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The number of pharmaceutical drugs is relatively small, and so it
may be feasible for an agency to examine all of them.234 Moreover, a
common metric, known as QALY (quality-adjusted life years), can be
used to assess the contribution of each drug to well-being.235 Even
QALYs will have some measurement challenges.236 But a more openended program, encompassing not only completed pharmaceuticals
but also advances in basic research contributing indirectly to cures,
would result in a much larger number of claimants, each of whom
would require a more detailed adjudication.237
With random selection, valuation becomes considerably easier,
because the total number of administrative hearings can be made arbitrarily small.238 Measuring the social contribution of any research,
however, will still be extraordinarily difficult.239 The more basic the
research, the greater the challenge.240 The agency working ex post will
need to consider how some particular piece of research contributed
to some broader research project.241 That broader research project
-Health-Impact-Fund%3A-Making-new-medicines-for-Hollis-Pogge/f8cfb5f5d27455
498320dc5dc3a599e418e1f538 [https://perma.cc/R6ZX-4G7P].
234. See generally Ljubica Cvetkovska, 32 Astonishing Pharmaceutical Statistics &
Facts for 2020, SUPPLEMENTS 101 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://supplements101.net/
pharmaceutical-statistics [https://perma.cc/P3YC-NYNX] (listing important facts
about the pharmaceutical industry including the number of drugs that are in development globally, the amount of drugs the FDA approves every year, and the amount of
money it costs to develop a new drug).
235. See Hollis, supra note 233, at 9 (“A drug that extended a person’s life by ten
healthy years would be recognized as having created ten QALYs.”).
236. Still, QALYs may be more easily measured than alternatives. See Matthew D.
Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 35–42 (2006) (explaining that QALYs values might be easier to measure than
willingness to pay/accept (WTP/WTA) values).
237. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFF., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2–3 (2006) (“The federal government spent more than $25 billion
on health-related . . . [research and development] in 2005. Only some of that spending
is explicitly related to the development of new pharmaceuticals. However, much of it
is devoted to basic research . . . .”).
238. See supra Part I.B (discussing methods of randomly selecting claims for adjudication and the implications of random selection).
239. See Magnus Gulbrandsen & Richard Woolley, Measuring Impact: Methods,
Challenges and Biases, U. OSLO: OSIRIS BLOG (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.sv.uio.no/tik/
english/research/centre/osiris/osirisblog/measuring-impact.html [https://perma
.cc/6B5G-FEU4] (explaining the difficulties in measuring the impact of research including, attribution, latency, and causality).
240. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
241. See generally Gulbrandsen & Woolley, supra note 239 (explaining the difficulties in attributing particular research’s contribution to a final project such as a motion
picture).
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itself might be just one component of a larger contribution.242 Similar
problems exist in patent law, when courts must assess damages for
infringement of a small component of an invention.243 Some have argued that, in part because of the salience of the infringed component,
valuations may tend to be exaggerated.244 With a fixed fund, all research contributions will be subject to exaggeration, and if the exaggeration is the same for each assessed contribution, the effect cancels
itself out.
Thus, an argument that the random selection mechanism will
produce distortions must be more subtle. The claim must be that some
types of contributions might be valued too high relative to other contributions. For example, suppose an argument exists that a basic research contribution will be valued too highly. Then, if intermediaries
anticipate this, they will pay more to buy claims for basic research
than they should relative to applied research. But if one anticipates
that intermediaries will incorporate into their calculations a bias
against applied research, then perhaps one should also anticipate that
the ultimate decisionmakers will recognize the possibility of such a
bias. If so, then those decisionmakers should be able to self-correct by
devaluing their initial assessments of basic research or increasing
their later assessments of applied research. For random selection to
produce systematic distortions, those distortions must be anticipatable yet not correctable. If everyone overvalues basic research and fails
to recognize that they are doing so, then the random selection mechanism is unlikely to correct the misallocation, but it is also unlikely to
exacerbate the problem.
The random selection approach is not, of course, the only possible mechanism by which a government (or international organization
distributing resources contributed by many nations) could subsidize
climate change research.245 The most obvious alternative is a grantgenerating body.246 A core difference is that grant-making institutions

242. See id. (“Research usually does not lead to certain impacts on its own or automatically. It is the combination of research with a range of other factors . . . that makes
the difference for a firm or for society.”).
243. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value
Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263 (2007) (discussing challenges in apportioning patent damages).
244. For an assessment of the effect of anchoring on patent damages, see Thomas
F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 199–203 (2018).
245. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
246. See Climate Change Research Grants, EPA (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.epa
.gov/research-grants/climate-change-research-grants [https://perma.cc/MD8L
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provide funding ex ante, while the random selection mechanism
measures ex post.247 If a grant-making institution is capable of making
sound ex ante assessments of the welfare contributions of different
grant proposals, then there may be limited need for an ex post mechanism.248 However, the random selection approach may be preferable
in several circumstances.249 First, the prospective number of projects
may be so large that the administrative challenges of creating the
grant-making agency may be overwhelming.250 Second, especially if a
large sum of money is involved, a grant-making agency may face
strong political pressures, for example, to allocate funding to particular regions.251 By delaying the eventual distribution of a fund, political
pressure may be vitiated. Third, if grant-making institutions are, as
some charge, excessively defensive of the conventional scientific wisdom,252 then the delay in distribution of the subsidy may facilitate supporting more longshot approaches.
B. COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, PANDEMICS, AND OTHER
DISASTERS
Subsection IV.A.1 highlights that one reason climate change is so
difficult a problem is that any governmental responses must ultimately affect individuals with heterogeneous circumstances.253 For
this and many other reasons, significant climate change can cause

-N4QD] (showing how the EPA uses funds to support research on various aspects of
climate change).
247. But see W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2019) (arguing
that grant-making institutions involve repeated interactions and thus are not entirely
ex ante).
248. But see infra notes 250–51 and accompanying text (explaining the advantages
of using a random selection approach).
249. See infra notes 250–51.
250. See Amara Omeokwe & Yuka Hayashi, SBA Under Fire for Failing To Get Aid to
Struggling Small Businesses, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/sba-under-fire-for-failing-to-get-aid-to-struggling-small-businesses
-11586343600 [https://perma.cc/826A-2RFU] (discussing the Small Business Administration’s difficulties in providing emergency grants to all of the small businesses that
are in need across the United States).
251. See Price, supra note 247, at 13–14 (noting this critique).
252. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Grant System Leads Cancer Researchers To Play It Safe,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/health/research/
28cancer.html [https://perma.cc/SNG6-TC7N] (explaining how grant-making institutions inhibit innovation in cancer research).
253. See supra Part IV.A.1 (claiming that divergent individual circumstances can
make it difficult for the government to devise reasonable payment formulas ex ante,
which will intensify administrative burdens).
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serious damage when it occurs.254 If past disasters and the coronavirus pandemic are a guide, the government might decide to pay compensation to those especially harmed by climate change.255 A random
selection approach can provide an administratively simple mechanism for the government to compensate those who suffer as a result
of climate change or other disaster, including another pandemic.256
In the United States, the government typically responds to a disaster by helping claimants pay for necessities such as rent and home
repairs and also approving low-interest loans for reconstructing damaged homes and businesses.257 Some of this money ends up being
spent on fraudulent claims.258 It is administratively challenging for an
agency to spend a great deal of money both quickly and carefully.259
Perhaps because of this administrative challenge, government spending following the pandemic largely focused on providing direct cash
payments to citizens regardless of demonstrated need,260 supplementing unemployment insurance,261 and subsidizing loans to assist
businesses in payroll expenses.262 Some commentators suggested different allocations, such as extending rebates to the elderly and disabled,263 but the shared implicit assumption was that Congress would
254. See Leslie Baehr, 22 Devastating Effects of Climate Change, BUS. INSIDER (June
11, 2014, 3:04 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/effects-of-climate-change
-2014-6 [https://perma.cc/8R8Y-VVRM] (detailing the various consequences of climate change on public health, housing, and the economy).
255. See supra notes 194, 196–98 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 66–67, 69–70 and accompanying text (presenting random selection methods).
257. See, e.g., FEMA Assistance Tops $1 Billion for Florida Hurricane Irma Survivors,
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/news-r-lease/
20200220/fema-assistance-tops-1-billion-florida-hurricane-irma-survivors [https://
perma.cc/44PP-Q4M8] (displaying the amount of funds that FEMA has given to the
survivors of Hurricane Irma for various purposes, including rental payments and home
repairs).
258. See, e.g., 4 Hurricane Irma-Affected U.S. Attorney Offices Form Fraud Task
Forces, INS. J. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/
2017/09/19/464738.htm [https://perma.cc/U4P2-T758] (describing how some U.S.
Attorney’s Offices have taken steps to combat disaster fraud related activity).
259. See supra note 250 (describing the difficulties the Small Business Administration has faced in distributing grants).
260. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, § 2201 (2020) (authorizing
“recovery rebates”).
261. Id. §§ 2101–07.
262. Id. § 1102 (establishing the Paycheck Protection Program).
263. See Daniel Hemel, Stiffed by the Senate Stimulus: The Surprising Group Left Out
of Coronavirus Rescue Bill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://
nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-stiffed-by-the-senate-stimulus-20200326-624
qm3qnvbhw7py2unylqpd6iy-story.html [https://perma.cc/TR2D-CL3V] (revealing
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need to specify who received how much, using limited sources of information such as tax returns.264 This assumption reflects a view that
it would be impossible to have an administrative regime that would
provide individualized assessments of loss attributable to the pandemic.265
With the random selection alternative, the government might still
allocate specific sums of money for particular disasters,266 but then allow markets to provide compensation. In such a program, we can conceive of the victims themselves as the claimants, who sell their claims
for compensation to intermediaries. These claims might be based on
specific expenses (such as repair bills after a hurricane) or on data
showing economic loss (such as proof that a business at which an individual worked was forced by the government to close). The fund in
this conceptualization would be distributed in proportion to adjudicated assessments of how much benefit the intermediaries provided
to the claimants or how much loss the claimants suffered. Alternatively, we might conceive of charities as the claimants, with a claim for
every type of relief granted. The charities might then hold on to the
claims, if large enough, or sell them to intermediaries aggregating
claims from multiple charities. However conceptualized, this system
would allow for consideration of the relative merits of different types
of relief. The ultimate question for adjudication would not be how
much money was given, but how much value was produced. For example, relief in the form of food might receive more credit than relief
in the form of entertainment. Moreover, distributional concerns might
be considered. Greater valuations might be given to relief that
that the COVID-19 relief package enacted in March excludes elderly and disabled “dependents” and other vulnerable groups).
264. But see Chuck Marr, Samantha Jacoby, Chye-Ching Huang, Stephanie Hingtgen,
Arloc Sherman & Jennifer Beltran, Future Stimulus Should Include Immigrants and Dependents Previously Left Out, Mandate Automatic Payments, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/future-stimulus
-should-include-immigrants-and-dependents-previously-left-out [https://perma.cc/
S3EF-WEX6] (presenting other explanations for why these groups were not provided
rebates, including the fact that the members of these groups aren’t primarily responsible for their financial support or that it was a mere legislative tradeoff).
265. See generally Eric Morath, How Many U.S. Workers Have Lost Jobs During Coronavirus Pandemic? There Are Several Ways To Count, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-many-u-s-workers-have-lost-jobs-during
-coronavirus-pandemic-there-are-several-ways-to-count-11591176601 [https://
perma.cc/SS9X-23K2] (proclaiming that estimates for lost jobs during the spring of
2020 ranged from 20 to 40 million).
266. See generally BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43537, FEMA’S DISASTER
RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 12 (2014) (describing debate over whether
FEMA should rely on supplemental appropriations).
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successfully targeted the poor or that successfully targeted those most
harmed by the disaster.
The novel coronavirus pandemic illustrated not only the government’s difficulty in determining how much individuals lost,267 but also
the government’s inability to direct spending to the most helpful items
for the pandemic.268 In comparison to spending on individual cash
payments, the government spent relatively little money on ventilators,269 which seemed that they might save many lives (though turned
out not to help as much as initially thought),270 or on respirators and
other protective equipment.271 Even though face masks greatly reduced transmission of the virus,272 and thus constituted the sort of
positive externality that standard economic theory suggests justifies

267. The government payments under the CARES Act were based on a simple formula, providing “up to $1,200 per adult for individuals whose income was less than
$99,000 (or $198,000 for joint filers) and $500 per child under seventeen years old–
or up to $3,400 for a family of four.” The CARES Act Provides Assistance to Workers and
Their Families, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/
assistance-for-american-workers-and-families [https://perma.cc/R2YA-XXFL]. The
amounts are calculated based on previous tax filings and Social Security records. See
id. Note that there is no effort to determine whether particular workers were employed
in industries especially likely to be affected or even to determine whether individuals
had suffered a decline in wages.
268. See supra notes 203, 205 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Nathan Layne, Outbid and Left Hanging, U.S. States Scramble for Ventilators, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2020, 1:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-health-coronavirus-usa-ventilators/outbid-and-left-hanging-u-s-states-scramble-for
-ventilators-idUSKCN21S20D [https://perma.cc/3Y6V-BLEY] (revealing that the federal government does not have enough ventilators to support all of the states in need).
270. See Sharon Begley, With Ventilators Running Out, Doctors Say the Machines Are
Overused for COVID-19, STAT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/
08/doctors-say-ventilators-overused-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/4BMU-Q492]
(explaining that some physicians believe that COVID-19 is more effectively treated
with devices that are less intense than ventilators).
271. For a pre-solicitation by the government for N95 surgical masks, see Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) N95 Surgical Masks/Respirators, Filtering Facepiece Respirator, BETA.SAM.GOV, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/d0c04e0df6e2458698a06812519d
462f/view [https://perma.cc/JK9Y-52KJ].
272. See The Simple Science Behind Why Masks Work, HEALTHLINE, https://www
.healthline.com/health-news/the-simple-science-behind-why-masks-work [https://
perma.cc/K2JX-KRGL] (explaining how masks can help reduce the transmission of
COVID-19).
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subsidization,273 the government took relatively modest measures.274
Public health officials pronounced that a vigorous test-and-trace program would allow the country to reduce transmission of the virus
more quickly,275 yet the government monopolized and botched testing276 and offered no inducements to private firms. The government
relied more on threats to mandate production through the Defense
Production Act277 than on incentives for companies voluntarily to
meet the needs of the pandemic. And while the government did subsidize an effort to produce a vaccine, total spending was far below what
cost-benefit analysis would justify.278 But the blame cannot be placed
entirely on a particular administration, as states did not pick up the
slack.279 For example, not a single state invested in a sufficient number
273. See Arguments in Favor of Mask Requirements During the Coronavirus (COVID19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arguments_in_favor_of_
mask_requirements_during_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020#Mask_
requirements_are_good_for_the_economy [https://perma.cc/4MT5-SJWH] (presenting arguments for why mask mandates are beneficial to the economy).
274. Some states mandated masks in some locations but did not subsidize the
masks or require higher quality surgical masks. For a rare exception of a program to
provide free masks, albeit only one per person, see Alicia Lee, The State of Utah Will
Provide a Free Face Mask to Any Resident Who Requests One, CNN, https://www.cnn
.com/2020/04/29/us/Utah-free-mask-coronavirus-trnd/index.html [https://perma
.cc/J5CM-63PA] (Apr. 29, 2020, 5:50 PM).
275. Cf. Denise Chow, Escaping the Coronavirus Lockdown with Test and Trace, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/test-trace
-how-u-s-could-emerge-coronavirus-lockdowns-n1182626 [https://perma.cc/M9LT
-H45P] (explaining how states can use testing and tracing to reduce the spread of
COVID-19 and relax lockdowns and other restrictions).
276. See Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie
Thomas & Noah Weiland, The Lost Month: How a Failure To Test Blinded the U.S. to
Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus
-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/F6UH-XLZ8] (Apr. 1, 2020) (describing how the
United States could have mitigated the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic through earlier and more aggressive screening).
277. See Michael Abramowicz, The Defense Production Act and Central Pandemic
Planning, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 19, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/
03/19/the-defense-production-act-and-central-pandemic-planning [https://perma
.cc/S856-5BAG] (discussing the Defense Production Act’s provisions and the powers it
bestows upon the executive branch).
278. See Susan Athey, Michael Kremer, Christopher Snyder & Alex Tabarrok, In the
Race for a Coronavirus Vaccine, We Must Go Big. Really, Really Big., N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/coronavirus-vaccine.html
[https://perma.cc/8ES8-6H5H] (advocating for the U.S. government to contribute
greater funds to vaccine research, given the impact that COVID-19 has already had on
the nation).
279. See Dylan Hayre, How State Governments Across the Country Failed To Protect
Our Communities from COVID-19, ACLU (July 2, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/
criminal-law-reform/how-state-governments-across-the-country-failed-to-protect
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of non-respirator surgical masks to ensure that everyone could wear
a new one each day, relying instead on homemade face coverings.280
An explanation for these collective failures is that it is not easy to scale
up an administrative program, deciding what to purchase, in what
quantities, and to whom to distribute it, especially if corruption and
cronyism are to be avoided. However, a market approach could be
scaled up quickly, without precisely determining what to spend
money on in advance. Had the government devoted a tenth of the
money that it spent on income support to random selection markets
rewarding private efforts to stop the virus, it might have saved both
lives and money.
Whether a market approach is superior to the status quo approaches to hurricane and pandemic relief depends on the market and
government’s relative skill at scaling up operations quickly, prioritizing important expenditures, and distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate claims. One objection might be that most of the value the government provides is prior to the disaster, for example, in the form of
stockpiling food and other necessities for a literal rainy day.281 But this
arguably militates in favor of the market random selection approach.
After all, private organizations might prepare stockpiles in advance in
anticipation of the government declaring a disaster.282 Then, once the
government announced the value of a fund for the disaster, the private
organizations would mobilize their resources. Some of these private
organizations might be for-profit; others might be non-profits that are
able to spend more as a result of this form of government subsidy. If
private organizations are better than the government at identifying
how ex ante expenditures might be useful in a disaster, then this
-our-communities-from-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/X25A-8CEM] (detailing how
state leaders have endangered incarcerated populations and communities as a whole
with their failure to adhere to warnings and take action).
280. See generally Mask Types, U. MD. MED. SYS., https://www.umms.org/
coronavirus/what-to-know/masks/mask-types [https://perma.cc/QY79-MP8H]
(presenting descriptions of N95, surgical, and cloth facial coverings).
281. See, e.g., Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6b (creating the Strategic
National Stockpile); ANNA NICHOLSON, SCOTT WOLLEK, BENJAMIN KAHN & JACK HERRMANN,
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE NATION’S MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE STOCKPILE:
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE
CDC STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK396382/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK396382.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ELF-DMVR].
282. See Roche Introduces Program To Facilitate Corporate Pandemic Stockpiling of
Tamiflu, FIERCE BIOTECH (June 27, 2008, 8:29 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/
biotech/roche-introduces-program-to-facilitate-corporate-pandemi-stockpiling-of
-tamiflu [https://perma.cc/FV48-VG48] (revealing how the pharmaceutical company
Roche has started a flexible purchase program that will enable American businesses to
“maintain access to their own stockpile of Tamiflu” in pandemic situations).
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approach might be superior to the status quo. Private parties can also
mobilize resources in hopes of selling to the government under the
status quo, but this is made more burdensome by the difficulty of contracting quickly enough. Moreover, charging enough to compensate
for the risk that stockpiled resources might never be used will lead to
charges of price gouging,283 and perhaps even criminal penalties.284
But if the government promises to reward entrepreneurs in proportion to the value that they provide, this is less likely, as the government
subsidy is framed as an ex post reward rather than as a response to an
extortionate ex ante demand.
Climate change presents a similar challenge to a natural disaster
fund,285 but in slow motion and potentially at a much larger scale.286
Although climate change might lead to specific disasters such as hurricanes,287 it also might cause gradual degradation of living conditions,
an example being coastal areas.288 The goal of a climate change compensation fund might be to spread the losses due to climate change
over an entire population.289 It might reimburse people not only for
damages but also for mitigation efforts, such as the cost of constructing levees,290 and for damages suffered as a result of governmental

283. See Michael Brewer, Note, Planning Disaster: Price Gouging Statutes and the
Shortages They Create, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1101, 1112–16 (2007) (describing and critiquing legal protections against price gouging).
284. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.160 (2019) (criminalizing unconscionable prices of
essential commodities during a state of emergency).
285. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
286. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Alistair J. Woodward & Jonathan M. Samet, Climate Change, Hurricanes, and Health, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 33 (2018).
288. See, e.g., Coasts, U.S. CLIMATE RESILIENCE TOOLKIT, https://toolkit.climate.gov/
topics/coastal-flood-risk [https://perma.cc/6QR7-GKT9] (Sept. 18, 2019, 4:32 PM)
(detailing the risks that rising sea levels pose for coastal properties and infrastructure
in the United States).
289. Cf. MICHAEL DWORSKY & LLOYD DIXON, THE IMPACT ON WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
INSURANCE MARKETS OF ALLOWING THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT TO EXPIRE 5 (2014)
(“TRIA mitigates the impact of terrorism on insurance markets by transferring catastrophe risk to the federal government and then spreading losses broadly across the
entire P&C policy-holder base in order to reduce the solvency impact a large attack
would have on any particular insurance company.”).
290. This assumes that levees in fact serve to mitigate climate change. But see Erika
Bolstad, Irony: Levees Could Make River Flooding Worse, SCI. AM. (May 9, 2017), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/irony-levees-could-make-river-flooding-worse
[https://perma.cc/Z72M-RXT4] (displaying the arguments from some researchers
that levees have caused increased recreational development on floodplains, which results in the over-channelizing of rivers). Ex post decisionmakers ought not reimburse
expenses that simply moved the effects of climate change from one place to another.
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mitigation efforts that help some at the expense of others.291 The fund
might be implemented at the state,292 national,293 or international
level.294 Larger-scale implementation may be ethically justified because some regions may suffer considerably greater losses than other
regions.295 Yet it may be politically treacherous to designate in advance how much money should go to each region because special interests may affect how money is spent, potentially resulting in money
being spent inefficiently on those mildly affected by climate change.296
The random selection market approach avoids the need to make
these decisions ex ante. Random selection will likely be justified if the
expectation of how average ex post decisionmakers are likely to spend
money allocates funds better than ex ante decisionmakers. Even if we
expect a great deal of idiosyncratic decision-making ex post, the intermediaries will price claims by averaging various possible results.
Meanwhile, it may be easier to arrive at an agreement ex ante, for the
general reason that it is easier for legislatures to pass statutes that

291. See, e.g., Jeremy Patashnik, The Trolley Problem of Climate Change: Should Governments Face Takings Liability If Adaptive Strategies Cause Property Damage?, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2019) (assessing the problem of damage that “results from
future government-sanctioned climate change adaptations designed to save other parcels”).
292. Cf. Montana COVID-19 Fund, MONT. CMTY. FOUND., https://www.mtcf.org/
Montana-COVID-19-Fund [https://perma.cc/C2XS-H5DT] (describing the Montana
COVID-19 Fund which was created by the Montana Community Foundation and the
Montana Nonprofit Association to help the state’s rural and tribal communities that
are struggling during COVID-19).
293. Cf. supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions of
the CARES Act that help citizens and businesses survive the COVID-19 pandemic).
294. Cf. COVID-19 Financial Assistance and Debt Service Relief, INT’L MONETARY
FUND, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker
[https://perma.cc/QL6L-RAMX] (Oct. 2, 2020) (explaining how the International Monetary Fund is providing financial aid and debt service relief to its member nations suffering from the economic consequences of COVID-19).
295. The IPCC estimates that if policy remains unchanged and global temperatures
rise by 3.66°C, global GDP in the year 2100 will be 2.6% lower than it otherwise would
be. INT’L PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IMPACTS OF 1.5°C OF GLOBAL WARMING ON NATURAL
AND HUMAN SYSTEMS 256 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/
2019/02/SR15_Chapter3_Low_Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LUE-SG2F]. Though this
purely economic effect is a serious loss akin to a global recession, it is sufficiently modest that in principle, people in less-affected regions could help those in more-affected
regions.
296. Analogously, Wyoming receives far more antiterrorism aid from the federal
government than either New York or California. See STEVEN MAGUIRE & SHAWN REESE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33770, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS TO STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: FY2003 TO FY2006, CRS-23 TO -24, -41 TO -42, -53 (2006), https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33770.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPW2-TWBN].
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punt significant decisions to administrative agencies.297 Because an
agency can operate based on a relatively simple standard, special interest provisions will be more obvious. This makes it more likely,
though not inevitable, that giveaways might be avoided. One approach
might be to provide modest funding early on, ideally under a standard
substantially free of political influence. Establishing this status quo
will make it more difficult for special interests to distort the criteria if
further funding is provided later.
There could, however, be negative consequences from the creation of a mechanism to provide disaster relief.298 The greater the expectation that the government will reimburse damages from climate
change or from a pandemic, the less incentive there is for individuals
to act to avoid losses.299 A similar problem already exists in the area
of flood damage.300 Recognizing the moral hazard created by expectations that the government will reimburse such damage, the government has undertaken various initiatives to require residents of flood
plains to purchase flood insurance.301 There is great resistance to such
requirements, though, even when such insurance is heavily subsidized by the government.302 Perhaps if a national government could
commit credibly not to provide climate change disaster relief, individuals would have better incentives to avoid such damage. But that may
297. E.g., Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2094 (2011) (“[L]egislatures punt to agencies to avoid accountability . . . .”).
298. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
299. See Kristin Tate, Coronavirus Reveals Financial Irresponsibility of Americans,
HILL (Mar. 22, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/488906
-coronavirus-reveals-financial-irresponsibility-of-americans [https://perma.cc/XF7Z
-7VEJ] (arguing that many Americans failed to properly save to prepare for an event
such as the COVID-19 pandemic).
300. See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (making numerous changes to the National Flood Insurance
Program). For a history of the National Flood Insurance Program and a proposal to
privatize it, see IKE BRANNON & ARI BLASK, REFORMING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: TOWARD PRIVATE FLOOD INSURANCE (Cato Inst. Pol’y Analysis, No. 817, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa817_2.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TH57-XLBQ].
302. See generally Sarah Strochak, Jun Zhu & Laurie Goodman, Too Many Homeowners Lack Flood Insurance, but Many Buy It Voluntarily, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (Sept.
18, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/too-many-homeowners-lack-flood
-insurance-many-buy-it-voluntarily [https://perma.cc/WW7G-9GLB] (revealing that
policies through the National Flood Insurance Program have declined over the past
decade and that the majority of individuals insured purchase policies voluntarily and
did not need governmental compulsion).
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be impossible, and it would penalize individuals who may have made
investments before climate change was even recognized as a significant danger. A gentler alternative might be to penalize those who undertake unwise investments after the creation of the initial compensation fund. The random selection fund might provide for
“appropriate” reductions in damages assessments where damages
were exacerbated by claimants’ actions after the passage of the statute. Such a provision would not be adequate in a rule-bound agency
but could work with an agency interpreting a standard in randomly
selected cases.
CONCLUSION
Random selection has long been understood as an economizing
device that allows for estimates of a population to be made based on
a sample of the population’s members.303 Random selection is even
used for quality assurance in some legal institutions, such as in the Social Security Administration.304 But institutions that have used random selection have generally used it as a means of measuring decisionmaker performance to improve decisionmaker incentives. Such
incentives may be inadequate to generate consistent decision-making,
especially if they conflict with other values, such as the norm of decisionmaker independence.305 But if a fund is divided among a random
selection of claimants in proportion to adjudicated valuations, then
the independence of government decisionmakers need not be compromised. Indeed, those decisionmakers may be given even more
freedom to account for a wide range of considerations, because idiosyncratic decision-making by government matters less. What matters
is how much market participants will pay, and they will have strong
303. See Greg Depersio, Using Simple Random Sample To Study Larger Populations,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042915/what-are
-advantages-using-simple-random-sample-study-larger-population.asp [https://
perma.cc/D9CQ-5CGN] (discussing random sampling and its benefits, including its
ability to create accurate representations of the larger population).
304. See David Ames, Cassandra Handan-Nader, Daniel E. Ho & David Marcus, Due
Process and Mass Adjudication: Crisis and Reform, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1, 31–40 (2020) (describing the methods used by the Social Security Administration to conduct quality assurance, including random sampling).
305. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1355 (1992) (“Management techniques are no match for claims
of independence. . . . The decision arena reflects a setting where individual decisionmaking prevails over attempts to regularize outcomes on a statistical basis.”); see also
Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 88–90 (2017) (explaining how peer review programs are often forced to compete with claims for decisional independence).
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economic incentives to bid up claims that are underpriced. Antitrust
law, consumer protection law, and antidiscrimination law can help ensure that claimants receive their claims’ expected value.
The result is that an administrative agency with few resources
aside from the fund to be distributed can be used to adjudicate a very
large number of claims, even if the legislation is phrased in terms of
standards rather than rules. Some potential interventions to address
climate change might require individualized assessments for large
numbers of potential claimants, so this is a fertile ground for considering whether tasks that one would ordinarily think impossibly complex for an administrative agency might be feasible. However, this Article has focused on just one type of task: the distribution of
government funds. This does not address the many other tasks that
administrative agencies perform, including the assessment of taxes or
fees.306 Random selection is a mechanism that can be used to discipline any type of decision-making in which governmental officials exercise considerable discretion. The possibility that random selection
might serve as a substitute for rules as a mechanism for preventing
discretion from leading to arbitration and consistent decision-making
has previously been disregarded in the legal literature, and government spending is but one area in which this tool might usefully be deployed.

306. One might wonder whether, instead of a rules-based carbon tax focused solely
on some forms of pollution, random selection could facilitate a tax scheme embodying
all activities contributing to global warming. A random selection system allowing taxes
to be calculated based on a standard would reflect some of the same logic as is considered here but also would present unique issues. I address these challenges in Michael
Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 997–
1001 (2011), which discusses the difficulties that can come with implementing a tax
scheme that uses random assignment.

